Appendix II: The Longer Telegram: Toward a New American China Strategy (Part II)

Given the reality of contemporary China—where Xi Jinping has concentrated nearly all national decision-making authority in his own hands and has used that power to fundamentally alter the trajectory of China’s political, economic, and foreign policy development—any U.S. strategy must maintain an intense, “laser-like focus” on Xi himself, his inner circle, and the Chinese political environment that enables their operation. Influencing and changing their decision-making requires a comprehensive understanding of the situation, an appreciation of how their internal dynamics function within China’s domestic political realities, and continuous tracking over time of the political and strategic calculus that shapes their actions. Any U.S. policy aimed at changing China’s behavior must be structured around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffective.

This strategy must also be sustainable over the long term—effective across the time horizon during which leaders like Xi Jinping dominate China’s central political institutions. American politics must function fully to ensure this strategy’s implementation, rather than substituting flashy slogans for a genuine American vision whenever Beijing is involved. At a minimum, this is what is required to defend our democracy against China’s challenge.

To implement such a strategy, Washington must first develop a solid understanding of Xi Jinping’s strategic objectives. The following list of Xi’s goals is based on long-term observation of Chinese political language and policy actions, as well as an objective assessment of where he has concentrated domestic resources:

Maintain the ruling status of the Chinese Communist Party at all costs; preserve national territorial integrity.

Sustain a level of economic growth sufficient to break through the middle-income trap.

Achieve sufficient military superiority to deter the United States and its allies from intervening in any conflict involving Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea.

Undermine the credibility of American power and influence to the extent that countries currently inclined to balance against China instead choose to align with it.

Deepen and maintain China’s relationship with Russia—its neighboring country and most valuable strategic partner—in order to block Western pressure.

Surpass the United States as a technological power, thereby replacing it as the world’s dominant economic power.

Weaken America’s dominance in the global financial system and the role of the U.S. dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency.

Consolidate the Belt and Road Initiative, transforming China’s massive transcontinental physical and digital infrastructure projects into a geopolitical bloc aligned with China’s policy ambitions, laying the foundation for a future China-centered global order.

Leverage China’s growing influence in international institutions to weaken and overturn international programs, standards, and norms perceived as hostile to Chinese interests—particularly in the areas of human rights and international maritime law—while advancing a new, more authoritarian international order under Xi’s deliberately vague concept of a “community of shared future for mankind.”

The CCP understands well Sun Tzu’s maxim that the supreme art of war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. The United States should do the same. Any American approach must seek to frustrate Xi Jinping’s ambitions.

This requires first identifying which U.S. national interests must be protected, including those of key partners and allies. These include maintaining overwhelming conventional military deterrence and preventing any unacceptable shift in the strategic nuclear balance; preventing Chinese territorial expansion, especially the forcible unification of Taiwan; strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships; preserving collective economic and technological advantages; protecting the global role of the U.S. dollar; defending (and where necessary reforming) the current rules-based liberal international order; and—most importantly—defending its ideological foundations, including core democratic values; as well as preventing catastrophic climate change.

Like China’s list of ambitions, this list is extensive, and given China’s significant and growing comprehensive national power, some may question how such a broad set of core national objectives can realistically be achieved. It may help to remember one overriding political goal: persuading China’s elite leadership that returning to the role of a status quo power is in China’s best interest. This means the Party must see a clearer path to success by remaining within the existing U.S.-led liberal international order, rather than attempting to build a competing one.

If the Party wishes to remain in power domestically, it is clearly in its best interest not to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China. In other words, China can become a global power very different from the one envisioned by Xi Jinping.

To achieve this outcome while protecting its core advantages, the most fundamental approach for the United States is to change China’s objectives and behavior. In formulating an effective China strategy, Washington should bear in mind the following structural principles.

A successful U.S. strategy must be built upon its existing strengths—the four foundational pillars of American power: national military strength; the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency and as the cornerstone of the international financial system; global technological leadership, given that technology has become the primary determinant of future national power; and the values of individual liberty, fairness, and the rule of law, which the nation continues to uphold despite recent political divisions and challenges.

The final pillar is particularly important. Any effective U.S. China strategy must be grounded in both national values and national interests. For decades, this has been a defining distinction between the United States and China in the eyes of the world. Defending universal liberal values and a free international order, alongside maintaining American global strength, must constitute the twin pillars of America’s global call to action.

U.S. strategy must also be fully coordinated with its major allies. This is not about making allies feel good; it is because the United States now needs them to win. China is closely watching these allied countries and places great importance on their weight in the overall balance of power between the United States and China. The reality is that as the power gap between China and the United States narrows during the 2020s, the most credible factor that can alter this trajectory is whether American power is augmented by the strength of its principal allies.

Realistically, this also means that the United States must act in accordance with the broader political and economic needs of its major allies and partners, rather than assuming they will align with Washington’s China strategy out of goodwill alone. Unless the United States can address the economic reality that China has already become the principal trading partner of most—if not all—of its major allies, this reality will increasingly affect their willingness to challenge China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage.

Washington must also rebalance its relationship with Russia, whether it likes it or not. Strengthening America’s alliances is essential, but in the future, separating Russia from China will be equally important. Allowing Russia to become fully absorbed into China’s strategic embrace over the past decade may prove to be one of the greatest geostrategic errors made by successive U.S. administrations.

The Biden administration must never forget the fundamentally realist nature of China’s international strategy for achieving success. Chinese leaders respect strength and despise weakness. They respect consistency and despise indecision. China does not believe in strategic vacuums.

The White House must understand that China remains deeply concerned about the possibility of military conflict with the United States today, but this attitude is likely to change over the next decade as the military balance shifts. If a military conflict were to break out between the United States and China and China failed to achieve a decisive victory, Xi Jinping would likely fall from power, given the CCP’s long-standing domestic propaganda asserting China’s inevitable rise. The regime’s overall political legitimacy would collapse.

Finally, the United States must address its own domestic challenges, particularly economic and institutional weaknesses at home. China’s successful rise has been based on a meticulously implemented strategy spanning 35 years, aimed at identifying and addressing structural economic weaknesses in manufacturing, trade, finance, human capital, and now technology. The United States must now do the same.