Chapter 33: America’s Anti-Communist Lessons (Part 4)

To numb American awareness, Yan’an even issued smokescreens, claiming that Mao Zedong wished to visit the United States to study American democracy. Every year on July 4, the National Day of the United States, Xinhua Daily published articles celebrating U.S. independence. On July 4, 1946, its editorial stated: “The Chinese people must establish an independent, free, democratic, and prosperous new nation; we will not stop until this goal is achieved.”

U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall was deceived by such propaganda and believed it to be true, passing the information to the President. At a critical moment when Nationalist forces were defeating the CCP, Marshall halted U.S. support to impose a four-month ceasefire, giving the CCP time to recover and reorganize, eventually turning the tide. Marshall’s actions effectively saved the CCP, which, with Soviet support, achieved consecutive victories in Northeast China, entered Tianjin and Beijing, and marched southward, forcing Chiang Kai-shek to retreat to Taiwan. Marshall’s misjudgment cost the United States control over mainland China.

After the Republic of China retreated to Taiwan, on October 4, 1949, the Soviet Union and other countries recognized the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC). The U.S. State Department reaffirmed recognition of the ROC government in Taiwan, but President Truman halted the supply of U.S. dollars and materials to the Nationalists. The idea of “recognizing the new China” became a hot topic in Washington, and there was widespread expectation that the U.S. would establish diplomatic relations with the CCP. At that time, U.S. Ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart, openly stated that the U.S. should recognize the CCP-led government to maintain normal relations—a choice he claimed would benefit U.S. interests in East Asia.

The U.S. government adopted a vague stance toward the CCP’s new government. Only after North Korea, under Kim Il-sung and with Stalin’s backing, crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, and invaded South Korea, did U.S. policy toward China become clear. On July 27, Truman ordered U.S. armed forces to support the South Korean government against the invasion and dispatched the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent any armed attack on Taiwan. The North Korean invasion prompted a complete reversal in U.S. attitude toward the ROC government in Taiwan. Discussion of “recognizing the new China” disappeared overnight.

During the decades following the Korean War, U.S.-China relations remained in a Cold War state until President Nixon opened China. Influenced by leftist intellectuals, Americans did not fully recognize the nature of totalitarianism. So-called “Sinologists,” like Ezra Vogel, misinterpreted CCP history, viewing the CCP as a benevolent force for the poor, superior to the Soviet Union, and sympathetic to its cause. During the 1960s, in the context of Sino-Soviet tensions, the U.S. tacitly sided with the CCP against its main adversary, the USSR. After the Zhenbao Island incident, when the USSR intended to use nuclear strikes to eliminate China, Nixon, for geopolitical balancing, opposed such an attack, signaling U.S. stance to China—effectively saving the CCP. In 1972, Nixon personally flew to Beijing to meet Mao Zedong, simultaneously abandoning Taiwan’s ally Chiang Kai-shek and allowing the PRC to replace the ROC in the United Nations. Nixon’s misjudgment opened the door and revived the CCP.

President Clinton was also deceived by the CCP. Jiang Zemin promised that joining the World Trade Organization would bring political reform and openness. Clinton imagined that the CCP would naturally evolve peacefully into a democratic state, akin to a delicate flower needing sympathy and assistance. In reality, Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of taoguang yanghui (“hide brightness, nurture power”) aimed at strengthening China. After 1989, Deng repeatedly emphasized: “observe calmly, stand firm, handle matters with composure, never take the lead, be good at maintaining simplicity,” summarized in eight words: “hide brightness, nurture power, achieve something.” These eight words encapsulated the core of CCP foreign strategy.

Scholar Zhang Lifan observes that Deng’s strategy of taoguang yanghui meant concealing true intentions, gaining benefits to grow stronger, and only then engaging in strategic competition. At the time, the U.S., while pursuing its own interests, hoped economic globalization and integration with the world might encourage peaceful political evolution in China. The CCP exploited this, becoming economically powerful over decades, eventually posing a strategic threat to the U.S. From taoguang yanghui to today’s muscular displays, China has gradually revealed its true nature, now recognized by the U.S. and other Western nations.

The CCP’s deceptive strategies have kept the U.S. off balance. According to Barry Buzan’s The Hundred-Year Marathon, Mao formulated a long-term strategy to defeat the U.S. as early as the 1950s. Buzan’s work exposed the CCP’s adept use of concealment and deceit to hide its true intentions, awakening many U.S. left-leaning China sympathizers to the reality: the CCP’s goal is to replace the United States as the global hegemon. Mao’s strategy of concealment was upgraded during Deng’s era into an economic development strategy—deceiving the West through apparent weakness while quietly accumulating strength. Under Xi Jinping, with China’s economic rise, the CCP now projects its ideology globally through propaganda campaigns.

Since the Roosevelt era, the U.S. has largely neglected ideological struggle against communism, allowing the CCP to freely penetrate U.S. society without a counter-propaganda strategy. America’s open society became a conduit for communist propaganda. The ideological contest between China and the U.S. constitutes asymmetric warfare. Over the past century, the U.S. has lost the ideological battle, allowing communist propaganda to dominate hearts and minds.

From its inception, the CCP has emphasized propaganda and psychological warfare. Mao said: “Revolution relies on two sticks—the gun and the pen.” The “pen” refers to propaganda and ideological struggle. CCP propaganda relies on fabrication to deceive the public. Lin Biao openly stated that major achievements could not be accomplished without lying. The CCP subscribes to Joseph Goebbels’ maxim: “A lie told a hundred times becomes truth.” Its vast central and local propaganda apparatus, especially in Beijing, employs thousands of cadres and invests billions annually in external propaganda.

Most Chinese-language media in the U.S. are influenced or co-opted by the CCP, avoiding negative coverage. Millions of Americans use WeChat, controlled and censored by the CCP. Chinese-American associations are infiltrated; during Xi Jinping’s visits to the U.S., they organize grand displays in line with CCP directives. CCP symbols and celebrations, including overseas Lunar New Year parades, are used to project influence, intimidating pro-democracy activists. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo warned that without resistance, the U.S. risks becoming a colony of the CCP.

The CCP also infiltrates U.S. academia. Over a hundred Confucius Institutes serve as propaganda bases, influencing scholars and public figures to act as emissaries for the CCP. Many U.S. academics, misled or complicit, act as “panda diplomats,” speaking favorably for the CCP.