Chapter 31: The CCP Is Not a “Paper Dragon” (Part I)

The greatest advantage of totalitarianism is the “whole-of-nation system,” which happens to be the weakness of democratic systems. Democratic systems often lose out to a whole-of-nation system. Some American scholars have overlooked the damage that a totalitarian whole-of-nation system can inflict on democratic systems, displaying a serious underestimation of the adversary. Veteran journalist David Frum declared in The Atlantic that “China Is a Paper Dragon,” arguing that claims China is about to surpass the United States economically, militarily, and technologically are grossly exaggerated by crude and inaccurate statistics, and that China’s economic, military, and technological strength has been “seriously overstated.” He called on U.S. policymakers to be more confident about the future and to place greater faith in trade, markets, and the limitless potential of free people.

History offers a cautionary lesson. During World War II, it was precisely America’s underestimation of the enemy that indulged Japanese militarism—the vicious dog of that era. China may indeed be unable to match the United States in economic, financial, technological, and military strength, but the CCP is by no means a “paper dragon.” Rather, the CCP is a real dragon—clad in camouflage and capable of breathing fire.

Blinken should carry forward former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s warning to the CCP: “Either you change it, or it will change us.” In his foreign policy speech at the State Department, President Biden said that China is America’s “most serious competitor,” but that the United States is willing to cooperate with China when doing so serves U.S. interests. In a phone call lasting more than two hours with Chinese leader Xi Jinping after taking office, Biden made clear that the United States does not seek “confrontation,” but that there is “intense competition” between the two countries, and that the United States will insist China compete “fairly” according to international rules.

The question is whether “fair competition” can exist between a constitutional democracy and a totalitarian system. Biden has said that he knows Xi Jinping well, and that deep down Xi does not possess even the slightest trace of democratic belief. He has told Xi directly that democracy and freedom are American values, that the United States will continue to focus on issues such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, and that he is rebuilding a global alliance of democracies and will convene a Democracy Summit in the United States to jointly hold China accountable for its actions. Biden has called this “a struggle between democracies and autocracies in the 21st century.”

Yu Maochun, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, said that China has its own long-term policies and strategies. At its core, China is focused on two things: first, the Chinese Communist Party’s insistence on maintaining the Party’s leadership; and second, promoting the superiority of socialism. It seeks to preserve this social and political system at all costs. China today is a global power. Its economic development, military expansion, and global influence—especially in critical communications technologies—have worldwide impact. This political system, centered on Party leadership and socialism, is designed for global expansion as a long-term plan, and this trajectory is inevitable.

As for who will prevail in the confrontation between democratic and authoritarian systems, it is still too early to predict. Within the United States, a current of “defeatism” is gaining ground. Former senior U.S. diplomat Chas Freeman argues that in the game of chess, the United States is a player whose moves are easy to read: beyond an aggressive opening, it has no further plan. As U.S.–China rivalry intensifies and Washington treats China as its primary competitor, pressure on China continues to mount. “If the United States continues to choose confrontation,” he argues, “it will find itself increasingly isolated. If U.S. policy toward China is defined as a moral crusade, most other countries will choose to distance themselves rather than be drawn in.” The United States would thus become isolated by the international community and lose the competition. Freeman contends that the United States should strengthen cooperation with China on global issues, warning that continued confrontation will only lead to “losing the moral way and thus losing support.”

Assessing U.S.–China relations on the basis of the two countries’ systems and values reflects the true nature of the relationship. The United States can no longer cling to the myth that economic reform will inevitably lead to political reform. Blinken, speaking about diplomacy toward the CCP, said: “The relationship between the United States and China will be competitive where it should be competitive, cooperative where it can be cooperative, and adversarial where it must be adversarial.” The deliberate use of three different words—“should,” “can,” and “must”—to define “competition,” “cooperation,” and “confrontation” carries deep meaning. Especially in areas where confrontation is a must, it must occur. This defines the basic tone of the current U.S. administration’s China policy: cooperate where cooperation is possible, and confront where confrontation is necessary.