Chapter 29: The Longer Telegram—Launching a New U.S. China Strategy (Part II)

The relationship between institutions and individuals is a dynamic balance. At times, institutions are stronger than individuals; at other times, individuals overpower institutions. Sometimes institutions restrain individuals; sometimes individuals hijack institutions. In the same period, both China and the United States produced leaders who “hijacked institutions.” In the United States, this was Trump. As a nontraditional “Republican,” Trump hijacked the Republican establishment and, during his four years in office, acted with impunity. Xi Jinping, under the banner of “anti-corruption,” purged and intimidated the CCP establishment, used “rule by leading small groups” to break institutional constraints on the general secretary, and seized complete control of the party, government, and military. Anyone who disobeyed was subjected to “shuanggui,” political dissent was eliminated, and the CCP as a state apparatus was thoroughly hijacked. He then openly challenged the international political order centered on the United States since World War II.

The Longer Telegram argues that “China’s strategy for many years has been to blur red lines in order to avoid precipitating an early, open confrontation with the United States. The United States must be very clear about which Chinese actions it will seek to deter, and which, if deterrence fails, would prompt direct U.S. intervention. These should be clearly communicated to Beijing through senior diplomatic channels to get China’s attention.” The United States should establish a coherent national strategy. The Longer Telegram delineates five red lines, including any Chinese military attack on Taiwan or its nearby offshore islands.

If the assessments of China in The Longer Telegram were based largely on unilateral American analysis, then the March 18, 2021 U.S.–China Anchorage high-level meeting fully revealed China’s own assessment of the United States. Yang Jiechi’s fifteen-minute speech became a landmark event in the history of U.S.–China relations. Some analysts identify “three attacks” within it. First, it was the first public attack on American ideology since the era of reform and opening. Yang said, “I believe that the vast majority of countries in the world do not recognize the so-called universal values advocated by the United States,” and that “how American democracy works should be judged by the people of the world,” while whether China has done well should be judged by the Chinese people themselves. Second, it was the first public attack on America’s global leadership since reform and opening, with statements such as “the United States does not represent the world,” “the United States itself does not represent international public opinion,” and “the Western world does not represent global public opinion.” Third, it was the first public attack on the existing international rules and order led by the United States. These “three attacks” fully confirmed the deepest concerns of U.S. policymakers over the past decade regarding “China’s rise”: concern that China infringes upon American values, threatens America’s leadership position, and challenges the existing international order. During the eras of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, Chinese leaders firmly denied such Western concerns. Now Zhongnanhai has coined a new slogan: “view the world on equal footing.” China and the United States are to stand shoulder to shoulder—effectively launching a comprehensive challenge to American ideology, leadership, and the U.S.-led international order, with grand ambitions to defeat and replace the United States.

This shows that The Longer Telegram’s projections about U.S.–China relations rest on solid factual analysis. It fundamentally negates decades of U.S. China policy. Nixon’s diplomatic mistake toward China saved Mao Zedong; through Deng Xiaoping, it has culminated in Xi Jinping. Over forty years of globalization, China became the world’s second-largest economy and also “fattened” the CCP. It is indeed large, but constitutionally weak, beset by numerous internal problems. There are over 100,000 mass protest incidents each year. Xi sits like someone perched atop a volcano, constantly guarding against internal “gray rhinos” and unpredictable “black swans.” What he fears most is a sudden collapse like that of the Soviet Communist empire in 1991. But such an outcome requires the combined force of internal and external pressures.

Just as the United States was a driving force behind the collapse of Soviet communism, the exit of Chinese communism from the stage of history will also require external pressure. One crucial element of that pressure is linking trade with China to human rights. This point is not reflected in The Longer Telegram. Yet the economy is the foundation of the CCP’s promotion of authoritarianism and repression of human rights. Today, the CCP dares to ruthlessly suppress dissent, religious believers, and Hong Kong’s democracy movement because of its economic rise. That rise, in turn, stems from the United States decoupling China’s human rights record from international trade.

On September 19, 2000, the U.S. Senate voted to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), paving the way for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. China thus entered a period of rapid economic growth and became economically intertwined with the United States—“you are in me, and I am in you.” Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “We tried it. We brought them into the World Trade Organization; we sent businesses to invest in China; we negotiated trade agreements…” “The United States cannot rely on the Chinese market.” “Look at the shortages of personal protective equipment and pharmaceutical ingredients during the pandemic—we were at China’s mercy.” “If we cannot reclaim the means of production, the United States will never prevail in competition with China.”

Republican Senators Tom Cotton, Jim Inhofe, and Rick Scott introduced The China Trade Relations Act, which seeks to revoke China’s PNTR status granted in September 2000 and revert U.S.–China trade relations to their pre-2001 status, requiring the U.S. president to annually approve extensions of China’s trade preferences. PNTR was previously known as permanent Most-Favored-Nation status.

The bill requires the president to review China’s MFN status annually under the Jackson–Vanik Amendment and expands the amendment to include human rights abuses and trade violations as disqualifying factors. Senator Cotton said, “For twenty years, China’s permanent MFN status has supercharged the loss of American manufacturing jobs. It is time to protect American workers and hold the Chinese Communist Party accountable for its forced labor camps and egregious human rights abuses.”

Zhong Wen concludes: There was the “Long Telegram” before; now there is the “Longer Telegram.” Separated by more than seventy years, times have changed, yet both telegrams share an unchanging target—communism. In 1946, the Soviet Union, buoyed by U.S. support during World War II, began to rise and soon launched the Cold War. In 2021, after three decades of biding its time, China unveiled its ambitions beginning in 2013 and, with “wolf-warrior diplomacy,” openly challenged the world and sought to rival the United States. A chill of a “secondary Cold War” swirls between the two nations. Beyond the ideological confrontation between communism and democracy, both telegrams also reflect economic competition. America’s new China strategy will find its historical lineage in these two telegrams and derive a clear framework for formulating coherent foreign policy.