Chapter 26: Pressuring the CCP to Transform and Bury Communism 2020 (Part I)

The renowned American “China hand” scholar Ezra Vogel passed away in 2020 at the age of ninety. The CCP mouthpiece Global Times immediately published a commentary titled, “Will the West See a Break in the Ranks of China Experts After Ezra Vogel’s Death?” It expressed concern over the passing of an old friend of the CCP, lamenting that pro-CCP and CCP-sympathetic China experts would become fewer, and noting with unease that today’s younger generation in the United States is more inclined to help America confront the CCP. Global Times specifically recalled that in July 2019, Ezra Vogel had taken the lead with more than one hundred China experts in signing an open letter titled “China Is Not an Enemy,” opposing the U.S. government’s anti-CCP policies. Now that Vogel was gone, the CCP had lost a powerful megaphone, and its sense of sorrow was palpable.

Ezra Vogel had founded the China Research Center at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He was among the earliest American scholars to conduct on-the-ground research into China’s reform and opening in the 1980s, and he was once a leading figure among U.S. scholars studying Guangdong’s reform and opening.

Vogel was a frequent guest of Deng Xiaoping. His most famous work was Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, published in 2012, which reportedly took ten years to complete. Deng Xiaoping’s promotion of economic reform and his role in enabling people to have enough to eat are well known, and Vogel naturally devoted extensive praise to this. The critical issue, however, is that Vogel defended Deng Xiaoping’s refusal to carry out political reform. In his book, Vogel quoted Deng as saying that political reform required time, that China was large and feared chaos, that stability had to come first, and that political reform should begin with pilot projects and proceed gradually. In reality, these statements were merely excuses for Deng’s lack of intention to pursue political reform—pretexts to delay and evade it.

Deng Xiaoping did not lack opportunities to undertake political reform. At a central conference of 4,000 people convened in September 1980, the majority called for abandoning Mao. Had Deng intended to cast off Mao Zedong, it would have taken only one final step for the CCP to begin its post-Mao transformation. Instead, Deng wielded the cudgel of the Four Cardinal Principles and kicked the ball back decisively. He then raised the banner of opposing “bourgeois spiritual pollution” to strike down the democratic reformers. Deng first removed Hu Yaobang, the general secretary widely seen as having the greatest potential to lead the CCP’s reform and transformation; he then removed Zhao Ziyang, another general secretary with similar promise. After that, he ordered the deployment of 100,000 troops and hundreds of tanks, culminating in the June Fourth massacre in Beijing in 1989, suppressing the democratic reform movement. Deng Xiaoping held high the Four Cardinal Principles and had no intention of political reform. Did Ezra Vogel not know these facts? Vogel avoided the truth and concealed and shielded a butcher. Even in 2012, Vogel continued to defend Deng Xiaoping—his intentions are deeply suspect.

Regarding Deng Xiaoping, writer Bi Ruxie commented in An Era Slowly Draws to a Close that Deng made enormous contributions to reform and opening in mainland China, causing people gradually to forget a basic fact: in essence, he was a military politician. His early life of constant warfare forged a militaristic mindset—“teaching Vietnam a lesson,” “never abandoning the use of force against Taiwan,” and “letting students shed a little blood if necessary.” At critical moments, Deng’s first instinct was military suppression rather than political resolution; he believed he possessed sufficient power to command the democratic tide to retreat.

One valuable point in Vogel’s assessment of Deng Xiaoping is that he corrected the public’s historical positioning of Deng. Deng styled himself as the architect of reform; Vogel said, “Not so.” Deng was not the designer of reform; in fact, he had no blueprint in mind and designed nothing. He was merely a general manager. On this point, Vogel was correct. Deng had only the pragmatism and opportunism of “crossing the river by feeling the stones.” What political innovation or design was there? He never even spoke of the direction of national development or the fundamental laws of the state. What he called “pragmatism” amounted to producing more grain, manufacturing more machines, ensuring people had enough to eat, and marginally improving living standards. Beyond that, he encouraged a portion of the population to get rich first, effectively tolerating the carving up of state assets to expand private enterprises.

In 2012, Vogel sent signals of encouragement to the CCP, boosting its morale. He said that as a respected great power, China should be more confident. In reality, Vogel meant that the CCP should be more confident. He consistently conflated the CCP with China—exactly what the CCP most wanted to hear. Vogel’s fundamental error lay in equating the CCP with China. In fact, the CCP has kidnapped China, claiming that the CCP is China, and that opposing the CCP is opposing China. This is precisely why the CCP needs “China hands” like Vogel as cosmetic artists—to conceal the devil’s true nature, to dress up the CCP as a beauty, and to deceive world opinion.

With Vogel’s passing, America’s so-called “China hands” lost a main pillar. As the saying goes, successors will follow. One figure worth mentioning is former U.S. ambassador to Beijing James Lilley. Born in Nanjing to a father who was a professor at the University of Nanking, Lilley was a veteran American diplomat with forty years of experience. After retiring in 2001, he joined Kissinger Associates and became known as a prominent dove on China policy.

On February 3, 2021, former U.S. ambassador to Beijing James Lilley warned that the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue no longer existed. He urged the United States to guard against the outbreak of military conflict, fearing that such a conflict could escalate into nuclear war. Lilley believed that the CCP was signaling a willingness to use force against Taiwan, and that U.S. support for Taiwan could lead to mutual destruction. Motivated by goodwill, Lilley feared that CCP military action could trigger a U.S.–China conflict and wanted the United States to avoid war, even nuclear war. However, countless lessons of history tell us that the Communist Party bullies the weak and fears the strong. In any contest with communism, the more one fears, yields, and seeks to avoid conflict, the tougher and more arrogant the opponent becomes—and the more determined it is to launch an attack.