Chapter 22: Taiwan’s Fate Depends on the United States 2019 (Part I)

In 1950, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur famously said, “Taiwan’s fate depends on the United States.” The core issues in U.S.-China relations are, politically, the problem of totalitarianism, and militarily, the Taiwan issue. The structure of a totalitarian regime dictates that, at certain periods, it must expand militarily to suppress domestic social tensions. Taiwan has always been the most vulnerable target for CCP threats and aggression.

In April 1950, the CCP occupied Hainan Island, and in May, they took the Zhoushan Archipelago. Tens of thousands of Kuomintang troops retreated entirely to Taiwan. The CCP then prepared to attack Taiwan. At the time, the U.S. considered having Chiang Kai-shek retire and placing Taiwan under trusteeship, aiming to neutralize the island and prevent a CCP invasion. After the CCP signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in January 1950, the U.S. regarded Taiwan as its unsinkable aircraft carrier in the East. Losing Taiwan would break the Pacific defense chain.

When U.S. policy toward Taiwan wavered, the Korean War suddenly broke out in June 1950. The United States quickly decided to assist South Korea against aggression and announced that the Seventh Fleet would enter the Taiwan Strait to prevent a CCP invasion. Taiwan was formally incorporated into the U.S. defense perimeter, removing the immediate threat of being taken by the CCP.

The United Nations decided to send a UN force to Korea, and Chiang Kai-shek actively requested to send troops. However, President Truman, cautious and fearful of “provoking trouble,” refused, concerned it would complicate relations with the CCP. If Truman had shown strategic foresight and allowed Chiang’s forces to participate—and permitted MacArthur to pursue and annihilate the CCP army—Chiang might have seized the opportunity to “retake the mainland” and reclaim power. Unfortunately, Truman’s timidity allowed Mao Zedong to achieve gains on the Korean battlefield.

Because Truman replaced MacArthur, the Korean War ended with the CCP holding the 38th parallel. Negotiations stalled for over a year due to Mao insisting on the unconditional repatriation of POWs while the U.S. demanded free choice. Stalin did not support such delays, but Mao used the POW dispute to leverage secret demands for atomic technology and arms assistance. After Stalin’s death in March 1953, Khrushchev generously aided the CCP. Mao eventually agreed to the armistice and allowed POWs to choose freely: 20,000 CCP soldiers chose Taiwan, while 6,000 returned to the mainland. Taiwan’s wartime “gain” from the Korean War was thus 20,000 captured CCP troops.

The Korean War ended in a stalemate at the 38th parallel. U.S. casualties exceeded 50,000; CCP casualties were officially 180,000, though Liu Shaoqi admitted 400,000, and Soviet intelligence reported 1 million deaths. Mao’s reliance on human-wave tactics never counted the cost in lives, always boasting of defeating “paper tigers.”

Throughout the 1950s, the CCP continued threatening Taiwan. In 1958, they shelled Kinmen to test U.S. resolve and military support for Taiwan, while also pressuring Khrushchev for increased aid. President Eisenhower, staunchly anti-communist, adopted a hardline stance against Mao, even planning to use nuclear weapons if necessary. Near the end of his term, Eisenhower personally visited Taiwan to show strong support, preventing CCP intimidation. Facing such strong U.S. backing, Mao effectively gave up on “liberating Taiwan”—it had become an empty slogan.

In the 1960s, Mao’s Great Leap Forward led to the Great Famine, killing 45 million people. Chiang Kai-shek once considered using this opportunity to retake the mainland, but the U.S. offered no support and never condemned the CCP’s inhumane neglect of the famine. In 1969, Nixon refused to support Soviet strikes against CCP nuclear facilities, saving Mao. In February 1972, Nixon visited Beijing, greatly elevating China’s international status while simultaneously undermining Taiwan’s standing. In October 1971, the U.S. leveraged its influence at the UN to admit the CCP and expel Taiwan, delivering a severe blow to Taiwan’s international status. Over time, CCP diplomacy and bribery eroded Taiwan’s formal allies, reducing its diplomatic partners from 30 in 2000 to 15 today (from 47 in 1949, rising to 70 in 1969).

Under U.S. recognition of CCP-controlled “One China,” Taiwan was marginalized. The U.S. maintained a deliberately ambiguous stance: negotiating with the CCP while providing Taiwan with limited arms sales under the Taiwan Relations Act to support self-defense.

This ambiguous U.S. approach persisted into the 2010s, keeping Taiwan in a long-term state of “maintaining the status quo”—neither unification nor independence—allowing peaceful exchanges with the mainland. From the 1980s to the 2010s, Taiwan mostly followed U.S.-China economic engagements to pursue economic benefits. Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-communist policies gradually faded. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) prioritized local Taiwanese interests, refraining from confronting the CCP’s atrocities, and fantasized about independence. However, under the “One China” understanding between the U.S. and CCP, Taiwan’s independence was practically impossible.

It was only after 2018, as the U.S. became more assertive toward the CCP, that Taiwan saw increased support. President Tsai Ing-wen closely followed U.S. policy, aligning with Washington against the CCP, and received U.S. backing for re-election. The Kuomintang, ambiguous in its stance toward China, lost the election.