Chapter 19: Clinton Fattened the CCP, 1993–2001 (Part I)

Since Nixon, the misjudgment of the CCP and the deviation in U.S. China policy had made “embracing the panda” the main theme of American engagement with China, continuing through Carter and George H. W. Bush.

American scholar Lin Pei-Rui noted that U.S. policy not only ignored China’s authoritarian rule but also helped strengthen the CCP’s power. In the days following the Tiananmen Massacre, although international sanctions were imposed on Beijing, President Bush secretly sent envoys to assure the Chinese leadership that he wanted to maintain good relations. When Congress began in the early 1990s to demand improvements in Beijing’s annual human rights record as a condition for “most-favored-nation” (MFN) trade status, President Clinton, under pressure from Wall Street, suddenly decoupled trade from human rights in 1994. U.S. capital and (in part, misappropriated) technology began to fuel the rapid development and export growth of Chinese manufacturing. With U.S. support, China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and received tens of billions of dollars in loans from the World Bank, helping its economy soar even further.

President Clinton was an enthusiastic promoter of letting the CCP “wild bull” enter the global market. Behind this, there were secrets unknown to outsiders. In 1992, as the Democratic presidential candidate, Clinton defeated George H. W. Bush (“Old Bush”) and entered the White House. Regarding U.S.-China relations, Clinton initially insisted on sanctions against China over human rights abuses. In September 1993, Clinton changed course, pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement” with China. This opened the path for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization and a broader gateway to global trade. In May 1994, Clinton decided not to link China’s MFN status to its human rights record.

In November 1997, China released Wei Jingsheng, a pro-democracy activist imprisoned for nearly 19 years, and five months later, student leader Wang Dan from the Tiananmen protests was also released, as “bait” to lure Clinton into a visit to China.

At the end of June and early July 1998, Clinton visited five cities in China with his entire family and a large delegation of government officials—an unprecedented scale for a U.S. presidential visit. Reagan’s 1984 visit had brought 600 people, already a record. Clinton’s entourage numbered 1,200. In addition to the presidential plane, several transport aircraft carried 60 tons of communications equipment, ten armored vehicles, hundreds of officials, several hundred businesspeople, 370 journalists, and dozens of professional bands. This visit was the largest U.S. presidential trip in history in terms of size and personnel. Time magazine even dubbed him the “Commander-in-Chief of Tourism.”

The CCP’s warm reception left Clinton very pleased. He willingly became the promoter of China’s integration into the global market. It is widely known that under Communist rule, China’s markets were government-controlled, and MFN benefits were only for market economies; the CCP had no legitimate qualification for MFN status (including duty-free or reduced tariffs). China systematically falsified information to deceive the U.S. into granting MFN treatment. Originally, MFN status required annual review and congressional approval. Clinton devoted great effort to lobbying Congress, claiming that granting MFN to China “has nothing but benefits,” asserting that “U.S.-China relations are heading toward unity, and China’s success is not a threat to the U.S.”

During the 1996 presidential election, Clinton’s campaign finance scandal—known as “China-gate”—broke out. The Chinese government, both before and during Clinton’s administration, tried to influence U.S. politics and Clinton’s campaign fundraising. The Chinese embassy coordinated donations, resulting in seventeen individuals being convicted of fraud or transferring Asian funds for U.S. elections. Clinton turned a blind eye to the CCP’s human rights abuses while vigorously promoting the decoupling of trade and human rights, paving the way for China’s WTO entry—a decision that was effectively executed.