Chapter 15: Carter – U.S.-China Diplomatic Relations, “One China, Respective Interpretations” 1979 (Part I)

Jimmy Carter was the 39th President of the United States. His tenure came at a critical moment following Nixon’s opening of China, a key period for determining the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In diplomacy, Carter actively mediated the conflict between Israel and Egypt, earning notable credit; at the same time, he promoted relations with communist countries, particularly further improving U.S.-China relations. His most important decision was the formal establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while severing official ties with the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan.

In December 1978, without consulting Congress or obtaining congressional approval, President Carter unilaterally announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the ROC and the recognition of the PRC. The announcement was delivered to President Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan by the U.S. Ambassador in Taipei, Leonard Woodcock. On January 1, 1979, the United States and the PRC signed the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, formally establishing diplomatic relations while ending official relations with the ROC. Concurrently, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly passed the Taiwan Relations Act, replacing the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. The Taiwan Relations Act stipulated that if Taiwan’s security were threatened, the United States has an obligation to assist Taiwan in self-defense. On January 1, 1980, the Mutual Defense Treaty formally ended, and the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the U.S. Taiwan Command (USTDC) withdrew, with all U.S. troops leaving Taiwan. Regarding Taiwan and the ROC, the core of the Shanghai Communiqué is “One China, Respective Interpretations”. The PRC repeatedly asserted its intention to use force to unify Taiwan, signaling potential war. Any attempt to oppose this would effectively violate the Shanghai Communiqué, the Joint Communiqué, and the solemn commitment to peacefully resolve cross-strait issues.

Regarding the ROC and Taiwan, the core principle of the Shanghai Communiqué remains “One China, Respective Interpretations.” The PRC reaffirmed its position: the PRC government is the sole legitimate government of China; Taiwan is a province of China that has long returned to the motherland; and the liberation of Taiwan is an internal matter of China, with no foreign interference permitted. This position clearly differs from the U.S. position. The United States acknowledges that people on both sides of the strait recognize there is only one China (without specifying the PRC), and that Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. government does not challenge this position. The U.S. government reiterated its hope that the Chinese themselves would resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. The statement that the “United States recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China” is expressed as the PRC reaffirming its own position.

The U.S.-China Joint Communiqué continued the core principle of the Shanghai Communiqué regarding Taiwan: “One China, Respective Interpretations.” The United States recognizes the PRC government as the sole legal government of China. The U.S. also acknowledges China’s position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Neither document explicitly recognizes the PRC as “China”; in other words, there are two governments in “China,” including the ROC government in Taiwan. The term “China” in both communiqués remains ambiguous and non-exclusive. According to the two U.S.-China communiqués, launching a war against Taiwan would violate the agreements. Military occupation of Taiwan would equally violate the communiqués.

The vague “One China” policy of respective interpretations faces serious challenges today. Since Biden took office, the U.S. has openly and strongly supported Taiwan. Some believe this approach is “reckless and dangerous,” potentially undermining the foundation of the U.S.-China “One China” policy and increasing the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, the main driver of the “weakening” of the One China policy is China itself. The U.S. is not being “reckless”; rather, it must respond to the serious threat posed by China by leveraging greater power, with Taiwan being part of that effort.

Carter did not visit the PRC during his presidency. After leaving office, in late August and early September 1981, he visited China and Japan at the invitation of Chinese authorities. In China, he was warmly received, hosted by PRC President Li Xiannian and received by CCP Central Military Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping. He visited China again in 1987. Carter stated that his greatest satisfaction during his presidency was facilitating the normalization of U.S.-China relations, believing that China could achieve peaceful reunification.

However, mainland China did not abandon its authoritarian system, so “peaceful reunification” was merely a promise. Carter’s understanding of communism was far behind that of America’s earlier anti-communist leaders and far inferior to his successor, Ronald Reagan. When the United States unconditionally established formal diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979, Carter did not realize he was dealing with a malevolent regime. He lacked an ideological vision to unite the U.S. in opposing communism, to leverage America’s advantages to support China in a strong reflective movement that could challenge Mao Zedong, advance political reform, and pave the way for Deng Xiaoping to abandon Maoism and communism toward democracy. At that time, even a minor expression of support from Carter for Deng’s rejection of Mao could have had a significant impact, potentially accelerating China’s political transformation. Carter clearly lacked a strategic vision for the free world in its struggle against communism, neglecting the international responsibility to support political reform in China. In effect, he unconditionally endorsed Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Persistences”: persistence in the socialist path, persistence in the dictatorship of the proletariat, persistence in the leadership of the Communist Party, and persistence in Marxism-Leninism.