Chapter 14: Nixon Saved Mao Zedong, 1969 (Part III)

In the 1970s, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution, plunging Chinese society into chaos and leaving the country internally hollow, with no capacity to resist the Soviet Union. The Soviets were not afraid of the CCP; only the USSR had the potential to strike China. The idea of “allying with China to contain the USSR” was purely theoretical. As for the claim that China, in return, would cease supporting North Vietnam, thus aiding the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, this is also tenuous. In reality, whatever China did regarding Vietnam did not affect the U.S. withdrawal.

In 1972, President Nixon broke diplomatic conventions and, disregarding national dignity, secretly flew to Beijing without formal relations. He directly entered Mao Zedong’s private study and bowed at Mao’s feet, causing an international sensation, glorified as the “Ice-Breaking Visit.” China gained unconditional recognition from the U.S., Taiwan was sidelined, the U.S. embassy was downgraded to a liaison office, and the United States handed over Taiwan’s UN Security Council seat to the PRC. Mao emerged from the “ice-breaking” unscathed and victorious, scoring a perfect 100, losing nothing. What did the United States gain? Almost nothing. The so-called “Grand Triangle” strategy of Nixon and Kissinger—“ally with China to counter the USSR”—was hollow. In the 1970s, China’s economy was collapsing; it had no capacity to confront the USSR. The idea of “allying with China to contain the USSR” was empty rhetoric. Likewise, the notion that China would, in return, abandon North Vietnam to help U.S. withdrawal is weak; in fact, U.S. withdrawal would have proceeded regardless of China’s actions in Vietnam.

Nixon’s extravagant “ice-breaking” visit was pandering to the enemy and harming allies. Taiwan, though smaller than mainland China, had a population and area three times the size of Israel; its national strength was not inferior to Israel, and its international importance was comparable. Would the U.S. willingly discard Taiwan? Would it sacrifice Israel?

From a broader anti-communist perspective, Nixon failed to recognize that the CCP had become the world’s primary enemy. The Soviet Union, after Khrushchev’s denouncement of Stalin, was undergoing softening and peaceful evolution. In contrast, Mao Zedong was violently pursuing the Cultural Revolution and international expansion, posing far greater global danger. By courting Mao to counter the USSR, Nixon committed a major strategic anti-communist error. In his later years, Nixon admitted that his 1972 initiative to open China may have created a “scientific Frankenstein.” This Frankenstein is today’s “high-tech totalitarianism” reshaping the world. Nixon released the genie of communism into the world.

At the time, Nixon faced the Vietnam War, domestic unrest, and international difficulties, with no clear way out. The Vietnam War was the longest in U.S. history, lasting ten years and costing at least $250 billion. Militarily, the U.S. did not lose outright, but the war altered the Cold War balance, weakening America. It exacerbated domestic racial and civil rights issues, creating a divided society and causing deep psychological trauma to the American people.

Nixon sought a rapid exit from Vietnam. Introducing China as a strategic piece in U.S.-Soviet rivalry seemed advantageous—but he failed to foresee that the United States itself would ultimately become a pawn of the CCP. In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, occupied Phnom Penh, and expelled the Cambodian communist Pol Pot regime. China intervened militarily in Vietnam, triggering the Sino-Vietnamese border war. Both sides claimed victory, but Vietnam suffered more losses. The U.S. did not intervene; it only requested that China withdraw from Vietnam and Vietnam from Cambodia. China’s attack on Vietnam became a gift to the U.S., which then began treating the CCP as an “ally.”

Mao’s support of North Vietnam against South Vietnam was effectively an attack on the United States. The Vietnam War was a continuation of the Korean War. During the Korean War, Chinese volunteer forces suffered countless casualties, and post-war, China remained sanctioned by the UN. Mao leveraged the Korean War to enhance his prestige in the communist bloc and tasted success. The Vietnam War offered him another stage. The U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam marked a low point in anti-communist efforts. The struggle between the U.S. and communism became entangled: the overt enemy was the Viet Cong; behind it was China; beneath both, potentially, the Soviet Union. Facing the Viet Cong, China, and the USSR, the U.S. chose the strategy of allying with China to counter the Soviets. From then on, China entered a period of peaceful coexistence with the U.S., allowing America to focus on its main adversary—the Soviet Union.

Zhongwen concludes: Half a century of history proves that Nixon’s inversion of right and wrong was entirely mistaken. In 1989, President George H.W. Bush, fearing displeasure from Deng Xiaoping, refrained from supporting the Tiananmen democracy movement—another error. In 2000, President Clinton unconditionally helped the CCP join the WTO, strengthening the communist regime and expanding its evil influence—yet another mistake. All these errors trace back to Nixon. He was the originator, and the consequences are still with us today. Nixon made a directional mistake, one that brought the U.S. into the tangled and irreconcilable relationship with the CCP that persists today.