Chapter 14: Nixon Saved Mao Zedong, 1969 (Part II)

Mao Zedong was shaken awake and rushed to prepare for war. Brezhnev was furious at the U.S. actions. After receiving a report from Zhou Enlai, Mao feigned calm, saying: “It’s just about a nuclear war! Atomic bombs are powerful, but I am not afraid.” At the same time, he proposed the “Dig Deep, Store Ample, Do Not Hegemonize” policy. The entire country quickly shifted into a wartime posture. Many enterprises converted to military production, the national economy transitioned to a mobilization footing, and a large number of factories were relocated to remote mountainous areas under the “mountain, dispersed, cave” Three-Line Construction strategy. Major cities such as Beijing began massive excavation of underground facilities.

The United States also prepared to retaliate against the Soviet Union. Kissinger revealed that President Nixon had signed a secret directive authorizing nuclear retaliation against over 130 Soviet cities and military bases. If a single Soviet medium-range missile were launched at China, the U.S. retaliation plan would be executed. Upon learning this, Brezhnev angrily shouted: “The Americans have betrayed us.” The Soviet plan to strike China’s nuclear facilities made Mao realize that the United States could be leveraged, marking the beginning of a transformation in Sino-American relations.

By the late 1960s, the United States, after long engagement in the Vietnam War and spending $250 billion without success, faced a declining international standing and needed to seek forces to counterbalance the Soviet Union. China had successfully tested its atomic bomb, elevating its international status and becoming an object of U.S. attention.

The Beijing government also sought to restore relations with the United States to enhance international standing and secure a seat in the United Nations. However, decades of ideological separation persisted. Kissinger noted: “Nixon has long cared about China but has been unable to find a channel to open relations.” In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration worked to improve relations with the Chinese Communist regime, easing travel restrictions to China and supporting visits by the U.S. table tennis team, leading to the famous “Ping-Pong Diplomacy.” Subsequently, Nixon unexpectedly announced his readiness to visit China.

Before Nixon’s visit, in September 1971, the Chinese Communist Party suffered the shocking defection and death of its second-in-command, Lin Biao. Lin’s attempt to flee the country shook the nation, shattering the Mao-Lin Cultural Revolution myth and causing internal disintegration. The people were awakened, widely doubting Mao’s authority. The Lin Biao incident dealt a severe psychological blow to Mao, leaving him in a very low state. Mao’s private doctor, Li Zhisui, recalled that after Lin Biao’s incident, Mao spent all day in bed, looking depressed and listless, suddenly appearing much older. When he stood, his back was hunched, his movements slow, his knees stiff, and his legs moved like two wooden sticks. Mao remained bedridden and restless for four months, growing increasingly weak.

Learning that Nixon had decided to visit Beijing acted as a powerful tonic for Mao; he forced himself to recover in order to receive Nixon.

After preventing the Soviet Union from striking China’s nuclear facilities in 1969, Nixon saved Mao. In 1972, he decided to come to Beijing again, effectively rescuing Mao a second time. Nixon completely ignored the decades of disasters Mao had inflicted on China, including the 1957 Anti-Rightist Campaign that persecuted and destroyed a million intellectuals, the 1958 Great Leap Forward which caused a three-year famine killing 40 million, and the 1966 Cultural Revolution, which resulted in the deaths of several million. Such a monstrously criminal communist leader—was it truly worth saving or befriending?

Before visiting China, in October 1971, Nixon used U.S. influence to secure the Chinese Communist Party’s admission to the United Nations, replacing Taiwan (the Republic of China). Mao jubilantly remarked at this major victory. The communist demon was the enemy of the free world, while Chiang Kai-shek’s Taiwan was a U.S. ally. Nixon misjudged friend and foe, recognizing an enemy as a friend while undermining a true ally, marginalizing Taiwan. China’s UN seat was a major gift to the CCP before Nixon’s visit, won unconditionally.

In February 1972, Nixon visited China for the first time and was received by Mao. He held talks with Zhou Enlai, opening the door for bilateral relations. Before the visit ended, the two governments issued the Shanghai Communiqué, stating their commitment to developing comprehensive, normal diplomatic relations. The United States recognized both sides of the Taiwan Strait as part of China, acknowledged the One-China policy, and supported a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The following year, Nixon sent special envoys to establish a diplomatic liaison office in Beijing, restoring communication channels severed since 1949. Formal diplomatic relations between China and the United States were established in 1979.