Chapter 14: Nixon Saved Mao Zedong, 1969 (Part I)

In March 1969, Mao Zedong launched attacks against the Soviet Union in the Zhenbao Island area along the Heilongjiang River, triggering border clashes. Mao initiated mass protest movements denouncing “Soviet revisionism.” Hardliners within the Soviet leadership advocated “once and for all eliminating the Chinese threat,” preparing to use medium-range ballistic missiles deployed in the Far East, equipped with multi-megaton nuclear warheads, to carry out “surgical nuclear strikes” against key Chinese military and political targets.

At the same time, the Soviet Union tentatively proposed to the United States a joint strike to destroy China’s nuclear facilities, which were still at an early stage of development. After June 1969, clashes along the Sino-Soviet border became frequent. On August 13, 1969, Soviet forces dispatched more than a hundred infantry troops, supported by tanks and armored vehicles, crossing into the Xinjiang border region and creating the Tielieketi incident, which resulted in the deaths of nearly 40 Chinese soldiers.

On August 20, 1969, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, acting on orders, urgently requested a meeting in Washington with Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Dobrynin informed him of the Soviet intention to carry out a nuclear strike against China and sought the U.S. position. At a minimum, the Soviets hoped the United States would remain neutral.

Faced with the Soviet inquiry, Nixon had three possible courses of action—upper, middle, and lower options. The upper option was to conditionally support the Soviet Union in striking the “demon” Mao Zedong, thereby triggering changes within the Chinese Communist leadership, possibly bringing Lin Biao or Zhou Enlai to power. This would include conditional support for destroying China’s nuclear facilities—using only conventional weapons or small nuclear weapons to avoid large-scale civilian casualties—forcing the Chinese Communist regime to halt internal terror, end its isolation, and open peacefully. At the time, China had suffered a catastrophic famine only a few years earlier, in which tens of millions had starved to death. Mao had launched the Cultural Revolution to purge Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping and was preparing to target Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai as well. He was deeply unpopular internally and recklessly provoked conflict with the Soviet Union to salvage his authority. Soviet retaliation would have been justified punishment.

The twentieth century produced three great demons: Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Zedong. Of the three, Mao Zedong was the most malignant. Hitler was defeated and died in 1945; Stalin died in 1953. Only Mao remained, continuing his madness and crimes. If Nixon had acted from the perspective of humanity’s broader struggle against communism, he should have focused his efforts on eliminating the greatest remaining enemy—Mao Zedong. By that time, the Soviet Union had already undergone Khrushchev’s four-hour secret speech exposing Stalin’s crimes, followed by a decade of reform and limited openness, pursuing peaceful coexistence and competition with the United States rather than direct confrontation. The Soviets showed a degree of restraint and respect toward the U.S.—otherwise, why would they have consulted Nixon at all?

Had Nixon possessed a grand strategic vision for humanity’s anti-communist struggle and decisively chosen the upper option to support the Soviets in striking the living demon, Mao Zedong could have been brought down much earlier. China’s reform and opening might have arrived a decade sooner, sparing the Chinese people ten additional years of catastrophe. The United States would only have needed to provide moral support, without direct involvement. Unfortunately, Nixon did not choose the upper option.

The middle option was for the United States to stay out of the infighting within the “camp of demons” (the so-called socialist bloc), allowing them to fight and weaken one another while the Western camp remained unaffected and unharmed—overall, a favorable outcome for the West. During the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes, a joke circulated in Europe: Marx had supposedly revised his slogan from “Workers of the world, unite!” to “Workers of the world, please stay farther apart from one another.”

Nixon did not choose the middle option either. Tragically, he chose the lower option: supporting Mao Zedong against Stalin. In reality, Stalin’s ghost was already half-dead; Brezhnev largely continued Khrushchev’s policies, and Stalin had not been resurrected. Nixon repeated an error similar to Roosevelt’s alliance with Stalin against Hitler—he saved Mao Zedong, leaving China with a massive hidden disaster that continued to wreak havoc on China and the world.

Nixon’s lower-option choice stemmed from his misjudgment of the Chinese Communist Party. As early as 1967, Nixon published an article in Foreign Affairs outlining his future strategy: “In the long run, we cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations… The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus, our goal, insofar as it affects events, should be to induce change.” Accordingly, Nixon had long been seeking opportunities to engage with the Chinese Communist regime. His patience paid off: he encountered a rare chance to betray the Soviet Union and court the CCP.

After urgent consultations with Kissinger, President Nixon mistakenly concluded that the greatest threat came from the Soviet Union and that the existence of a strong China served Western interests.

As a result, the United States deliberately allowed Soviet intentions to leak to the media. On August 28 of that year, The Washington Star published a report titled “Soviet Union Plans Surgical Nuclear Strike Against China,” stating: “According to reliable sources, the Soviet Union plans to use medium-range ballistic missiles armed with multi-megaton nuclear warheads to carry out surgical nuclear strikes against key Chinese military bases, including the Jiuquan and Xichang missile launch centers and the Lop Nur nuclear test site.”