Chapter 13: Resolute Anti-Communism: From Eisenhower to Kennedy, 1956–1963 (Part I)

On October 24, 1956, Britain, France, and Israel secretly decided in Paris—without informing the United States—to send troops into Egypt in order to reclaim control of the Suez Canal. The background was that Egypt had barred Israeli ships from using the canal and had begun aligning itself with the Soviet Union, deciding to purchase Soviet weapons. This angered the United States, which in response halted its aid to Egypt for construction of the Aswan High Dam. In July 1956, Egypt announced the nationalization of the canal. Britain held 41 percent of the canal’s shares and France 52 percent. Egypt’s expropriation of British and French assets infuriated both countries and pushed them to undertake military action together with Israel.

On October 29, 1956, Israel launched a surprise attack, sending troops into the canal zone. Britain and France immediately demanded that both sides cease fire. Israel accepted the demand in appearance but in reality continued its military operations. Egypt’s refusal to halt fighting provided Britain and France with a pretext to intervene. On October 31, British and French naval and air forces bombed the Egyptian air force. On November 5, 22,000 British troops occupied parts of the canal area. Egypt resisted fiercely, engaging in street fighting.

The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was widely condemned by the international community. The United States was angered at having been kept uninformed in advance and also labeled the action an invasion. President Eisenhower telephoned British Prime Minister Anthony Eden to apply pressure. The United States deliberately sold off British pounds, causing the currency to depreciate by 15 percent, and also halted economic assistance to Britain.

The United Nations Security Council convened to discuss the Suez Canal crisis. The United States demanded that Britain and France immediately withdraw and proposed the deployment of United Nations forces to Egypt.

At this time, the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Hungarian crisis, yet it did not neglect to intervene forcefully in the canal crisis. It warned Britain and France and threatened to use nuclear weapons if necessary, even though in reality it did not yet possess missiles capable of striking them. On November 5, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum to Britain and France, withdrew its ambassador from Israel, and proposed joint military action to the United States. This move greatly diluted international condemnation and attention directed at the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

The United States, meanwhile, continued to align with the Soviet position, condemning the Anglo-French invasion and threatening to cut off oil supplies.

On November 6, under immense international pressure, Britain and France were forced to accept a ceasefire. The crisis led to Eden’s downfall and a sharp decline in Britain’s global prestige. Soviet influence rose dramatically, placing it on a par with the United States as a superpower, especially expanding its reach in the Arab world.

In January 1957, Eisenhower recognized the growing Soviet threat in Arab countries and proposed allocating $200 million to provide economic and military aid in the Arab world to counter communist expansion. This policy became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Eisenhower emphasized that the Middle East was vital to the free world, that the United Nations could not be a completely reliable guardian of freedom, and that the United States might, if necessary, use its armed forces to protect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Middle Eastern states. Initially, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan supported the doctrine; later, including Saudi Arabia, thirteen countries expressed support. Egypt, Syria, and others rejected it.

In 1958, Charles de Gaulle came to power in France. He believed that the United States was not a reliable ally and sought to confront both the Soviet Union and the United States independently, forming a “third force.” This exposed a lack of unity within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in confronting the communist threat.

By striking its allies hard during the Suez Crisis while sparing its adversary during the Hungarian Crisis, the United States exacerbated divisions within the Atlantic alliance, giving the Soviet Union opportunities to exploit and accelerating communist expansion. This was a major failure by Eisenhower in the struggle against communism. The Middle East aid plan the following year was a significant attempt at remediation.

In October 1956, the Hungarian Crisis and the Suez Canal Crisis occurred almost simultaneously. U.S. intelligence failed completely, having no advance knowledge of either event. Afterward, Washington was at a loss, mishandling both crises, with enormous consequences for the world. The West lost across the board, while the Soviet Union emerged with full gains: the anti-communist uprising in Hungary failed completely, and communist expansion in Arab countries succeeded.

When the anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary was close to full success, the Soviet leadership hesitated over whether to send troops again. What the Soviets feared most was U.S. intervention. Repeated statements—three times in succession—by Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower that the United States would not intervene gave Khrushchev reassurance, enabling him to brazenly decide on another invasion of Hungary. It is no wonder that Khrushchev later boasted, “The support provided by the United States was essentially like the support a rope gives to a man being hanged.” The Hungarian anti-communist revolution was thus buried by the United States.

It is foreseeable that if the United States had issued a hard warning that a Soviet invasion would lead to catastrophic consequences, and simultaneously warned Eastern European satellite states that cooperation with such an invasion would be severely punished, the Soviet Union would have had to reckon with America’s overwhelming military superiority. Soviet nuclear forces were no match for those of the United States, and Moscow might well have refrained from further intervention. If the Soviet Union had dared to invade, the Hungarian revolutionary government—which had already declared withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and neutrality—could have invited U.S. forces to defend its neutrality, giving the United States legitimate grounds to intervene militarily against the invasion. Instead, the United States feared escalation into nuclear war and repeatedly declared that Hungary would not be a potential U.S. ally, thereby reassuring the Soviets and allowing them to act without restraint.

American errors led to the complete failure of the Hungarian Revolution. Otherwise, communism would have been breached in Eastern Europe, and the end of communist enslavement of the entire region would have come much sooner.

In contrast to its non-intervention in the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the United States imposed excessively harsh punishment on its allies for the Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal, even aligning with the Soviet Union to pressure them, to the point of failing to distinguish friend from foe. In reality, the Anglo-French invasion paled in comparison to the Soviet invasion. America’s severe intervention dealt Britain a heavy blow and alienated France. Two years later, de Gaulle came to power, distanced France from the United States, and sought to form an independent third force. By 1966, this culminated in France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command, opening a breach in the anti-Soviet, anti-communist alliance.

From its mishandling of these two major crises, the United States learned painful lessons: first, neglect of intelligence, as there was virtually no intelligence apparatus in Hungary; second, poor communication and coordination among allies, leading to disunity; and third, insufficient toughness toward the enemy and a shallow understanding of the evil of communism. When the United States retreated, the Soviet Union advanced. The failure of the Hungarian Revolution demonstrates that in today’s world, any anti-communist, anti-Soviet righteous cause that lacks decisive American support is destined to fail.