Chapter 11: Truman’s Weakness and the Loss of China, 1949 (Part II)

Mao Zedong once said, “The United States was the third party in my romance with Stalin. Stalin was afraid that the United States would lure me away.” Mao worried that maintaining contact with the United States would arouse Stalin’s suspicion and mistrust, so he adopted a series of pro–“lean-to-one-side” and anti-American actions.

On January 5, 1950, President Truman stated, “The United States will not use military force to intervene in Taiwan, nor will it become involved in the Chinese civil war.” On January 12, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared, “Asian nationalism is consistent with American interests and incompatible with communism.” This was clearly an attempt to sow discord between China and the Soviet Union, while courting and appeasing the Chinese Communist Party. Acheson also said, “It is Russia, not the United States, that has violated China’s sovereignty.” He pointed out that Russia had seized four regions in northern China, and further stated that “the United States does not include Taiwan and Korea within its defense perimeter.”

When Stalin learned that the United States was placing its hopes on the CCP—and that Washington even intended to use the British as intermediaries to probe the possibility of developing trade relations with the Communists—he became deeply alarmed. In 1950, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung launched a war against South Korea in an attempt to swallow it whole. The United Nations passed a resolution to intervene, and troops from sixteen countries, led by the United States, entered Korea to resist the North Korean offensive. With Stalin’s backing, Mao Zedong, despite opposition from other CCP leaders, decided to send troops to “Resist America and Aid Korea.” This decision resulted in casualties numbering in the millions and inflicted severe damage on China’s national strength. Mao mobilized the entire propaganda apparatus to promote anti-American sentiment, planting the seeds of enduring hatred toward the United States. To this day, the Chinese mainland has not confronted Mao’s responsibility for this tragedy; instead, Mao is still credited with merit for “Resisting America and Aiding Korea,” and anti-American sentiment has been passed down from generation to generation.

In October 1950, U.S. Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) proposed launching attacks on Chinese military bases along the Yalu River, even suggesting the possible use of atomic weapons if necessary. President Truman, weak and timid, rejected the proposal out of fear that Soviet involvement would escalate the war. MacArthur publicly broadcast his views. In April 1951, Truman, fearing the outbreak of a Third World War, relieved MacArthur of his command. When MacArthur returned to New York, he was welcomed by millions in a massive and enthusiastic reception, severely damaging Truman’s prestige. Truman’s approval rating plunged to 26 percent. Legislatures in four states passed resolutions calling on Truman to reverse his decision. Truman’s hopes for reelection were dashed. MacArthur’s stature and his tough stance toward China won widespread public support.

MacArthur was four years older than Truman and was both a military strategist and a statesman. As Supreme Commander in Japan, he opposed the complete dismantling of Japan’s system. He told Truman that if such a course were pursued, Truman would need to send him another one million troops. MacArthur agreed to retain the emperor and not prosecute him for war crimes, enabling Japan to make a successful and stable transition to democratic constitutional governance. Toward communism, however, MacArthur clearly recognized its evil nature and believed it must be punished decisively. He therefore openly broadcast his views and hoped Truman would change his mind. Instead, Truman dismissed him. Truman paid a heavy political price: by 1952 his approval rating fell to 22 percent, making reelection impossible. He implored Dwight D. Eisenhower to run for president and even offered to serve as his running mate, but Eisenhower ignored him.

Had Truman accepted MacArthur’s advice—or had MacArthur been president instead of Truman—the U.S. military could have destroyed Chinese bases supporting the war in Korea, advanced to the Yalu River, cut off the CCP’s rear supply lines, and rendered the hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops in Korea unable to survive, facing starvation and freezing conditions. Surrender would have been their only option. The CCP would have suffered a crushing defeat, and the Korean War could have ended in complete victory. Stalin, in fact, was even more afraid of being drawn into the Korean War and dared not intervene directly. He provided air support to the CCP but ordered Soviet forces to remain in the Northeast as rear support and not cross into Korea, fearing direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Truman lacked the courage to act decisively at the moment when victory was within reach. He failed to punish the aggressors and their accomplices, leaving future troubles behind, and instead chose to negotiate an armistice with Mao Zedong. Otherwise, the North Korean communist regime would not exist today, and Korea would have been unified long ago. Truman’s weakness allowed the CCP to continue its reckless behavior in Vietnam during the 1960s. In the Korean War, 54,260 American soldiers were killed.

The Soviet Union emerged as the biggest winner of the Korean War. The conflict triggered a direct confrontation between China and the United States, while the Soviet Union avoided direct involvement. The war weakened American power and diverted U.S. attention from the European front along the Iron Curtain to the quagmire of Korea, buying the Soviet Union precious time to recover from World War II devastation, develop advanced defense technologies, and narrow the gap with the United States.

On March 12, 1947, President Truman, in a message to Congress concerning aid to Greece and Turkey, proposed “the containment of communism” as the guiding principle of U.S. political ideology and foreign policy. This principle became known as the Truman Doctrine. After World War II, Truman supported the Marshall Plan to counter communism, especially by aiding Greece and Turkey and saving them from communist takeover. In 1949, Truman also led the establishment of the powerful North Atlantic Treaty Organization to collectively guard against Soviet communist aggression. The Truman Doctrine became the guiding strategy and expansion plan for the United States in its pursuit of global hegemony after World War II, and it is widely regarded as marking the official beginning of the Cold War between the capitalist bloc led by the United States and NATO, and the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Zhong Wen concludes: Looking at Truman’s record in opposing communism as a whole, he had both merits and faults. He lacked a clear understanding of the true nature of communism. As early as June 23, 1941—the day after Germany launched its invasion of the Soviet Union—Truman, then a senator, stated that since Germany was stronger than the Soviet Union, the United States should help the Soviet Union. This reveals his failure to recognize the inherent evil of communism. On the issues of China and Korea, Truman committed three major, medium, and minor mistakes. His major mistake was sparing Mao Zedong during the Korean War. Communist propaganda turned Mao into an anti-imperialist hero, enabling the CCP to rampage unchecked to this day—an influence that has yet to be eliminated and has reappeared in China’s fifth-generation leadership through anti-American nationalism. His medium mistake was sparing Kim Il-sung, who was never punished as he deserved for launching the Korean War. His minor mistake was failing to break the Soviet blockade of Berlin with force, responding instead only with an airlift. Truman’s performance in confronting communism was a failing grade—he earns no more than 55 points.