Chapter 11: Truman’s Weakness and the Loss of China, 1949 (Part I)

In December 1945, on the eve of the renewed civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, President Truman continued to cling to the illusion that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) could avoid full-scale war through negotiations. He dispatched George Marshall to China twice to mediate between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong. Marshall was deceived by Zhou Enlai’s soft and skillful diplomatic manner and came to believe that Zhou was a liberal, convinced that his liberal thinking would not rigidly adhere to communist dogma. Marshall even came to regard the Kuomintang as conservative, evil, and sinister, while viewing the Chinese Communist Party as merely foolish.

Marshall naively believed that only by forming a coalition government—placing the Communists in the role of opposition—could corruption within the Kuomintang be eradicated, and that this was the best way to counter communism. He believed that the international impact of corruption within the Kuomintang was greater than Americans’ fear of communism itself.

Marshall showed clear favoritism toward the CCP. By threatening to suspend American aid, he forced Chiang Kai-shek to halt military operations for four months, giving Mao Zedong precious time to regroup, catch his breath, and consolidate his position. In December 1946, Truman issued a statement on China, once again repeating the call for a united and democratic government. By early 1947, the CCP launched a large-scale counteroffensive, reversing the course of the civil war. Marshall, unable to resolve the situation, returned to the United States in January 1947. Had Marshall and Truman not misjudged the situation so naively and missed the critical window, the outcome might have been very different: in 1946, Chiang Kai-shek commanded more than two million troops, while Mao Zedong had only several hundred thousand. American mediation delayed the full outbreak of the civil war by a year, benefiting the CCP by buying time and ultimately costing Chiang Kai-shek his regime.

Had the United States fundamentally recognized the evil nature of communism and wholeheartedly supported Chiang Kai-shek, China would not have been turned red by Mao Zedong. In 1948, Mao himself admitted that if the United States had openly supported Chiang and helped him recover, it would have been hard to say whether Mao could have achieved total victory. As late as January 1949, Mao stated bluntly, “What I fear most is U.S. intervention—if the U.S. and Chiang strike together, I would be forced to retreat.” Stalin was likewise most worried about U.S. aid to Chiang. Yet by this point, Truman was already preparing to terminate support for Chiang and move toward direct contact with the CCP. On January 13, U.S. Ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart announced that the United States would no longer mediate and would adopt a policy of non-intervention and observation toward the Chinese civil war. This statement lifted a tremendous weight from Mao Zedong’s mind.

In early 1949, under instructions from Washington, Ambassador Stuart began deliberately preparing for recognition of a CCP government. He contacted ambassadors from other countries and advocated that foreign diplomats remain in Nanjing. On April 23, Nanjing fell to Communist forces. Among all foreign missions, only the Soviet ambassador followed the Nationalist government to Guangzhou. Zhou Enlai arranged for Huang Hua—who had a teacher-student relationship with Stuart—to serve as director of foreign affairs in the Nanjing Military Control Commission and to establish private contact with him. In May 1949, CCP representatives met with Ambassador Stuart, who stated, “The United States no longer supports the Kuomintang. The fact that the U.S. Embassy remains in Nanjing proves this.”

Stuart further stated that once Communist forces entered Qingdao and Shanghai, U.S. Army and Navy forces would withdraw. However, in order to protect approximately US$200 million in American assets in Shanghai, the United States was considering retaining some naval vessels and troops there. Stuart also said that once a Chinese coalition government was established, it would receive diplomatic recognition from many countries. At this point, however, Mao Zedong merely brushed Stuart off with perfunctory responses.

What Mao feared most was that at the final critical moment, the United States might take some form of action that would thwart his ambition for total seizure of power at the last step.

On the second day after Communist forces occupied Shanghai, May 28, 1949, Mao Zedong issued instructions to senior military commanders. He noted that U.S. imperialism showed certain signs of possible intervention and ordered that contact with Stuart be maintained, so as to keep alive some hope among Americans regarding the CCP and prevent them from completely giving up. This was Mao’s psychological warfare; Stuart became a card Mao skillfully played. What Mao most desired was for the United States to abandon Chiang Kai-shek entirely. When Stuart sought a meeting with Zhou Enlai, Mao deliberately kept him waiting until June 21. Mao also instructed Zhou Enlai to respond to Stuart, hinting that if Stuart wished to come to Beijing, a meeting could be arranged. Even at this point, Mao was unwilling to sever this line of contact. Stuart, in turn, conveyed to the CCP that if it adopted a neutral stance rather than fully aligning with the Soviet Union, the United States could lend the new CCP government US$3–5 billion in one tranche. Mao even said he would welcome Stuart like an old friend.

Stalin remained deeply concerned that the CCP’s advance south across the Yangtze River might provoke U.S. intervention. As late as May 26, 1949, Stalin sent a telegram to Mao Zedong warning him to pay close attention to American movements, particularly the danger of U.S. landings at northern ports, and urging Mao to deploy elite troops to defend Tianjin and Qingdao. On June 11, Mao replied to Stalin, reporting that Communist forces had already been deployed in accordance with his wishes.

On May 13, 1949, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a telegram to Stuart proposing recognition of the CCP government. At that time, President Truman was deeply disappointed by corruption within the Nationalist government, angered by the embezzlement of American aid by senior officials, and concluded that Chiang’s regime was beyond saving. He placed his hopes instead on establishing relations with the CCP. To America’s dismay, on June 30 Mao Zedong published On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, explicitly declaring a policy of “leaning to one side”—toward the Soviet Union. Upon hearing Mao’s declaration of “leaning to one side,” Stuart, left with no alternatives, departed China on August 2 in accordance with U.S. instructions.

Corruption within Chiang Kai-shek’s government was a fact, but it was not incurable; compared with the CCP’s killing and plundering, it was minor by comparison. Truman’s unrealistic fantasies about the CCP led the United States to abandon Chiang Kai-shek and lose all of China. Yet the U.S. government refused to admit fault. It absolved itself entirely of responsibility for losing China. The White Paper: United States Relations with China, 1944–1945 asserted that the Republic of China lost a civil war due to Kuomintang failures, that this outcome had nothing to do with U.S. China policy, and that the United States bore no responsibility. The United States ceased supporting the Republic of China government, while also refraining from formally recognizing the new Communist government on the mainland.

In his private diary, Chiang Kai-shek lamented that his disastrous defeat on the mainland was not truly a defeat by the CCP, nor by the Soviet Union, but by the United States. It was America’s lack of support and refusal to intervene that caused the loss of China. Mao Zedong successfully deceived Marshall; Marshall confused Truman; and Truman, in confusion, lost China. In the 1950s, U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy also argued that erroneous China policy was the primary cause of America’s loss of China.