Chapter 09: American Aid to Europe’s Recovery — Containing Communism, 1948 (Part II)

The Soviet Union not only refused to participate itself, but also obstructed Eastern European countries from joining. From the outset, the Marshall Plan was open to most European nations. Czechoslovakia likewise sought American assistance. Stalin believed that the injection of U.S. capital into Eastern Europe fundamentally conflicted with the Soviet objective of establishing Soviet-style regimes in the region. He convened the leaders of Eastern European countries in Poland and coordinated a collective rejection of the Marshall Plan. From this point on, the essence of the Soviet Union’s hostility toward the United States—rooted in communist ideology—became increasingly clear. It was not until the outbreak of the Berlin Blockade that the Soviet Union and the United States fully entered into a “contest” between two opposing systems.

After the end of World War II, Stalin repaid American wartime assistance with hostility, turning against his former ally and launching the blockade of West Berlin in an attempt to strangle the U.S. presence there. Under existing agreements, Soviet forces occupied eastern Berlin, while the western sectors of the city were occupied by the United States, Britain, and France. All ground access to Berlin was controlled by the Soviets, while the Western powers retained the right to use three air corridors connecting Berlin directly with the American and British occupation zones. On June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to expel the United States, Britain, and France from Berlin by cutting off all land routes into West Berlin. West Berlin lay deep within the Soviet-controlled zone of East Germany. To sustain basic survival, the city required at least 4,500 tons of supplies per day. At the time, West Berlin’s food reserves were sufficient for only thirty-five days. The Soviet blockade triggered the largest airlift operation in human history.

By sealing off West Berlin with military force, Stalin was also testing the limits of American foreign policy. How would the United States respond? President Truman worried that a military confrontation with the Soviet blockade might spark direct conflict and lead to a full-scale U.S.–Soviet war. He neither consulted Britain and France to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union, nor accepted the recommendation of General Lucius Clay, the U.S. commander in Germany, who urged the immediate dispatch of large armored convoys to forcefully protect the supply routes. Instead, Truman weakly agreed to rely solely on massive air transport to counter the blockade. Faced with the Soviet Union’s aggressive advance, Truman responded passively, allowing Stalin to probe the true bottom line of American resolve.

On June 26, 1948, the airlift operation—code-named “Operation Vittles”—formally began. The United States began flying food, fuel, and other essential supplies into West Berlin, not as a one-time effort but on a daily basis, continuing as long as the Soviet blockade remained in place. The airlift posed enormous challenges. West Berlin had a population of 2.5 million. To supply sufficient food, medicine, clothing, and desperately needed coal by air alone required one aircraft to take off every three and a half minutes, around the clock, twenty-four hours a day. The United States, Britain, and France combined their airlift capabilities into a temporary joint task force, constructing what became known as an “air bridge.”

With extraordinary determination and endurance, the Berlin Airlift lasted for more than a year—and continued for several months even after the Soviet Union announced the lifting of the blockade. The United States received full support from Britain and France. Together, the three countries conducted a total of 280,000 flights, delivering 2.5 million tons of supplies. Although the Soviet blockade failed to strangle West Berlin, the United States paid a massive price in manpower, material resources, and financial cost. All the losses were borne by the United States and its allies; the Soviet Union suffered no losses and faced no punishment whatsoever.

The blockade lasted nearly a full year. In the Berlin crisis, although Truman acted decisively, he was not sufficiently tough in the face of Soviet threats. He should have followed General Clay’s advice, countering the blockade with armed protection while simultaneously pursuing firm negotiations. On May 11, 1949, the Soviet Union lifted the blockade of West Berlin, and Stalin’s attempt to force the United States, Britain, and France out of Berlin failed. The largest and longest airlift in aviation history came to an end following agreements reached between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The Berlin confrontation served as a rehearsal for the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, ending with the lifting of the blockade.

Zhong Wen comments: Totalitarian rulers grow accustomed to ruling their own people with brute force. The people’s habitual submission reinforces a psychological pattern in the minds of such rulers: force is the only language in their dictionary. Naturally, they carry this mentality onto the stage of international politics, attempting to extract benefits through intimidation and coercion. Truman’s response to the blockade through airlift, while indeed a display of “weakness,” also demonstrated the resilience of the United States and its allies in resisting communism. The powerful air capabilities of the United States, Britain, and France not only successfully saved West Berlin—the forward outpost of East–West confrontation—but also intimidated the Soviet leadership. The Berlin Airlift model avoided direct military confrontation. However, it did little to weaken or dismantle totalitarianism itself. To weaken and ultimately dismantle totalitarianism requires the establishment of a strong, collective defense alliance.