Chapter 08: George Kennan – The Soul of American Anti-Communism, 1947 (Part I)

Although George Kennan never held a high-ranking office, as a prominent anti-communist thinker during the Cold War, his influence in the history of American anti-communism was absolutely no less than that of any contemporary U.S. president.

Kennan’s understanding of the Soviet Union began with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR. In 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President of the United States and the U.S. established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, the young George Kennan accompanied Ambassador William Bullitt to Moscow. In the Soviet Union, Kennan studied Stalin’s Great Purge, read Soviet newspapers and magazines, and interacted with Soviet émigrés. Through this systematic analysis of Soviet political institutions, values, and propaganda, he formed a unique understanding of the internal dynamics of the Soviet regime.

Kennan recognized that the Soviet Union implemented autocratic rule internally and exhibited relentless expansionism externally. Its policies were virtually identical to those of Tsarist Russia; the main difference was that Marxist-Leninist slogans had replaced Orthodox Christianity and Pan-Slavism. He concluded, “The current Soviet system is absolutely contrary to Western traditional systems; there can be no middle ground or compromise between the two.”

On February 22, 1946, while temporarily acting as Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union, Kennan handled dispatches from Washington. On that day, he received a message from the Treasury Department inquiring why the Soviets did not wish to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Similar questions frequently came to the U.S. mission: “Why are Soviet leaders negotiating without sincerity?” “Why do the Soviets refuse to aid postwar European reconstruction?” At the time, U.S. policymakers still regarded the Soviet Union as an ally and partner, failing to recognize the essence of Stalinist totalitarianism. Kennan, however, had exceptional insight. He dictated an 8,000-word telegram analyzing the fundamental contradictions between Russian nationality, socialism, and capitalism, explaining why Marxism succeeded first in the USSR, and clarifying the logic of Soviet foreign policy. He advised that the United States abandon naive hopes of cooperation with the USSR, educate the American public about Soviet reality, focus on domestic recovery to deny the USSR opportunities, and assist in European postwar reconstruction.

This telegram became known as the “Long Telegram.” In May 1947, Kennan expanded these ideas and published them in Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym “X,” producing the famous “X Article”, The Sources of Soviet Conduct. Kennan argued that Soviet behavior was the product of ideology and historical environment. He identified two key beliefs driving Soviet policy: first, the Soviets saw inherent conflict between capitalism and socialism; second, they believed themselves to be perpetually correct. This assessment remains widely regarded as accurate.

Kennan advised that, in the foreseeable future, the United States could not maintain political goodwill with the Soviet Union and must treat it as an adversary—but that it was possible to contain it. Western powers collectively were far stronger than the USSR, allowing the U.S. to implement a firm policy of containment. He argued that the U.S. should not passively defend or remain confined to established borders but should take initiative and pressure the USSR to induce gradual peaceful change.

Kennan demonstrated that the Soviet regime’s inherent expansionism posed a strategic threat to the U.S., writing that America could increase pressure on the Kremlin to compel it to adopt far more restrained and cautious policies than in recent years. By doing so, he argued, the U.S. could promote trends that would ultimately soften or dismantle the Soviet regime.

Kennan’s ideas became the theoretical foundation of the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. policy of containment, and they were also a key influence behind the Marshall Plan. Between 1947 and 1948, Kennan held significant positions under Secretary of State George C. Marshall, contributing critically to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.

The profundity of Kennan’s theory lay not only in launching America’s diplomatic strategy but also in analyzing the structural roots of Soviet totalitarianism to explain the inevitability of Soviet expansion. He elevated U.S.-Soviet strategic confrontation to an all-or-nothing framework. Kennan argued that the Soviet worldview originated from traditional Russian instincts and historical insecurity; these fears, masked by Marxist ideology, drove expansionist policies. He concluded that the Soviet Union’s ultimate goal was to weaken major Western powers, expand its sphere of influence, and eventually impose global communist rule. Soviet international behavior was primarily determined by the internal needs of Stalin’s regime, which required an adversarial world to legitimize its dictatorship.

The Long Telegram offered an in-depth analysis of Soviet domestic society and foreign policy, providing a foundation for the U.S. strategy of containment, which shaped global politics in the second half of the 20th century. Kennan also recommended establishing a federation in Western Europe to counter Soviet influence and compete with Soviet strongholds in Eastern Europe. His anti-communist ideas have had a profound and lasting influence on subsequent generations of American diplomats and scholars.