Chapter 07: Marshall Deceived, the CCP Saved 1946 (Part II)

Marshall continued to apply pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to extend the ceasefire in Northeast China. After Chiang reluctantly agreed to a 15-day ceasefire, Marshall demanded that the truce be extended for four months, even suggesting that the entire North Manchuria region be handed over to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This meant a direct clash between Chiang and Marshall. Chiang, under mounting pressure from Marshall and a stern warning from President Truman, was left with no choice but to comply. The result was that Chiang became little more than a puppet in Marshall’s hands, and the strategic balance between the Nationalists and the Communists began to shift.

Marshall, utterly deceived, even asked Chiang, “Is there any evidence that the Soviet government is giving advice to the Chinese Communist Party? Are they helping them?” It was well known that the CCP was formed with Soviet funding and advisers, and was essentially a branch of the Soviet-led International Communist Movement. In February 1948, Marshall even told the U.S. Congress, “We have no concrete evidence that the Communist army in China is receiving support from external Communist forces.” How could the U.S. have been so unaware? Both American and British intelligence had intercepted numerous Soviet communications with the CCP. Many of these messages were sent from Moscow directly to Yan’an, clearly showing the deep connections between the Soviets and the CCP. Even the head of the U.S. Army observation group in Yan’an had warned Marshall: “Communism is international!” Yet Marshall remained completely ignorant, falling for the CCP’s deception.

Under U.S. pressure, Chiang reluctantly agreed to continue the ceasefire in Northeast China. This provided the CCP with crucial breathing room, allowing them to establish a massive base in North Manchuria, an area larger than Germany, stretching 1,000 kilometers in length and 500 kilometers in width. The CCP referred to this territory as a comfortable “sofa,” with the Soviet Union at its back, and North Korea and Outer Mongolia serving as strategic support.

The four-month ceasefire allowed the CCP to reorganize its forces, including the reorganization of 200,000 former Manchukuo troops. During this time, North Korea not only provided military supplies but also transferred a 200,000-strong, well-trained force to the CCP, including soldiers trained by both the Japanese and Soviets. North Korea thus became a “hidden rear base” for the CCP.

Soviet assistance was also critical. Soviet engineers repaired over 10,000 kilometers of railway lines and 120 bridges, enabling the CCP to quickly move large forces and heavy Soviet weaponry to attack major cities. All of this support—Soviet, North Korean, and Outer Mongolian—was conducted under absolute secrecy. Meanwhile, the CCP spread the false narrative that they were fighting Chiang with nothing but “rice and rifles.”

At the time of the ceasefire, the Nationalist forces still held a significant advantage. The Nationalist army numbered 4.3 million, while the CCP had only 1.27 million soldiers. The Nationalists had driven the Communists out of most major cities in China and nearly all of the Yangtze River basin. However, with North Manchuria as their base, the CCP was able to recover. By October 1946, when Chiang resumed his offensive, the CCP had fortified the region during the ceasefire, turning it into a near-impenetrable stronghold. After several battles, the Nationalists gradually lost the initiative in Northeast China.

In January 1947, Marshall left China, and U.S. mediation efforts officially failed. By this point, it was too late for the U.S. to provide further aid to Chiang. The CCP had already secured its strategic position through Soviet support, and Marshall, unintentionally, had helped the Communists. He returned to the U.S. in disgrace, while Mao Zedong laughed at Marshall’s naiveté. The U.S. strategists, too, were foolish and naïve in their understanding of China. While their naïveté may have been “cute” in some ways, when it led to the suffering of millions of innocent civilians, it was anything but “cute” — it was catastrophic.

Marshall’s mission in China was intended to mediate the civil conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists, avoiding a full-scale civil war, and helping to establish a peaceful, democratic, and unified government. However, as the civil war escalated after World War II, the Nationalists and Communists found themselves locked in a life-or-death struggle with irreconcilable differences. Ideologically, the Nationalists leaned toward Washington, and as the legitimate government of China, they were America’s natural ally. However, the Nationalist government’s corruption and inefficiency led to widespread American disillusionment. On the other hand, the CCP’s “false” support for democracy and freedom won them favor with many naive Americans. From a strategic standpoint, the U.S. believed that a peaceful, democratic, and unified China would best serve American interests. Marshall’s actions were centered on achieving this goal. But his mistake was failing to recognize the CCP’s true ambition for absolute control.

Critics of Marshall’s China policy argue that it was a moderate and neutral policy closely aligned with President Truman’s views. As a special envoy, Marshall sought to act as a neutral mediator, but the biggest paradox of his “neutral” policy was that he neither fully committed to the Nationalist cause nor recognized the CCP’s “deceptive negotiations” while they simultaneously prepared for war. As a result, Marshall’s mediation efforts were exploited by the CCP, who used the ceasefire as an opportunity to regroup and prepare for the next phase of the civil war.

Zhou Enlai once compared three American diplomats sent to China: Stilwell, Hurley, and Marshall. He said that Stilwell executed Roosevelt’s policy of equally aiding all anti-Japanese forces. Hurley, he noted, “openly sided with Chiang Kai-shek and exposed his imperialist face.” As for Marshall, Zhou described him as “direct, simple, calm, similar to Stilwell.” Zhou further remarked, “I had a good personal relationship with Marshall, and I thought he was a wise man.” This personal assessment is contrasted by later criticisms of Marshall, with some saying, “General, you helped the Communists defeat Chiang Kai-shek.”

Zhong Wen concludes: Marshall was hailed as a strategist for his success in implementing the European Recovery Plan (the Marshall Plan), but in China, he suffered a complete failure. He failed because he was ignorant of the true nature of the CCP and was deceived by Mao Zedong’s lies. Marshall’s naïveté ultimately led to Truman’s loss of China, plunging the nation into the depths of a disastrous communist regime. Today, U.S. policymakers still face similar issues, relying on sinologists who only have a partial understanding of China, and some advisors influenced by the CCP, acting as double agents, who offer harmful, pro-CCP advice to American leaders. As a result, the U.S.-CCP rivalry has been marked by repeated blunders, with each mistake compounding the next.