Chapter 07: Marshall Deceived, the CCP Saved 1946 (Part I)

In August 1945, Japan surrendered. Military clashes soon erupted between the Nationalists and the Communists over surrender authority and surrender zones. In an effort to mediate the dispute, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China Patrick J. Hurley proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that Mao Zedong be invited to Chongqing for negotiations. On August 25, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Wang Ruofei, and others arrived in Chongqing to hold talks with the Nationalist government on inter-party relations and postwar reconstruction. On October 10, the two sides signed the “Double Tenth Agreement.” Yet despite this, armed conflicts continued unabated, with Communist forces pressing their attacks under Soviet support.

In Chongqing, Marshall was clearly misled by Zhou Enlai’s falsehoods. From the outset, Zhou poured flattering words into Marshall’s ears, praising the United States and claiming there was much China should learn from it: the spirit of national independence from the era of George Washington; Lincoln’s ideals of government “of the people, by the people, for the people,” and Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from aggression; as well as America’s agricultural reforms and industrialization. Zhou patted his chest and assured Marshall that China could no longer afford civil war. He claimed the Communists advocated drafting a constitution through a Political Consultative Conference, followed by a reorganized government convening a National Assembly to adopt it, thereby leading China toward constitutional governance. In hindsight, all of Zhou Enlai’s statements were lies.

Even before Marshall’s arrival, the Chinese Communist Party had formulated a strategy to deceive the United States—something later echoed by Deng Xiaoping’s reform-and-opening rhetoric and the notion of having “a thousand reasons to get along well with America.” In 1944, Roosevelt sent a U.S. Army Observation Group to Yan’an. Mao Zedong even said, “We are considering changing the Party’s name, not calling it the Communist Party, but something else.” He claimed the CCP was merely a group of moderate rural reformers, not communists, and that it could fully cooperate with the United States. Mao further declared, “Since the Opium War, for 104 years, there has never been such a favorable environment. All democratic countries of the world are helping us. In the past, only the Soviet Union helped us; now Britain and the United States not only do not oppose us, but also help us…”—a smokescreen aimed squarely at America.

This strategy of deception worked. It blinded President Truman’s envoy, General Marshall. In 1946, Mao instructed Zhou Enlai to stabilize Marshall with lies. Mao lied without cost, claiming that the Communist Party shared many similarities with the United States, which greatly appealed to Marshall. At their first meeting, Zhou said the CCP “looked forward to American-style democracy.” A month later, Mao claimed he preferred the United States to the Soviet Union and told Marshall: “There are rumors lately that I intend to visit the Soviet Union. I laugh when I hear them. If I ever had a chance to go abroad, the place I would want to visit is the United States.” Mao added that one could learn many things by going to America. Mao lied effortlessly; Marshall believed him completely. He even relayed these remarks to Truman. Years later, Marshall still said, “The Communists cooperated with me more than the Nationalists.” Mao thoroughly deceived Marshall. Marshall reported to Truman that Mao intended to introduce an American political system. For Marshall to say such a thing was the height of folly. Misled by Zhou Enlai, Marshall saw the CCP’s evil concealed by its propaganda and came to believe the Nationalists were worse than the Communists.

Marshall reported to Truman: “I had a long talk with Mao Zedong. I was as frank as possible, and he showed no dissatisfaction, assuring me that he would cooperate to the fullest extent.” Marshall also claimed that Communist forces in Manchuria were “little better than a rabble,” and that communication between the Yan’an headquarters and local Communist units in the Northeast was “virtually impossible,” showing how little he grasped reality. Mao portrayed the CCP as pitiable, winning Marshall’s sympathy. In truth, Mao was directing the nationwide civil war from Yan’an all along.

Marshall lacked an understanding of Chinese culture, especially the Communist culture of struggle. He did not understand that the Communists sought both to conquer the country and to rule it—and that the purpose of conquering was precisely to rule. The throne of power could not be shared with enemies. While in China, Marshall tried to persuade both sides using American history. He said, “Anyone who understands history knows that the United States once had a Civil War—a life-and-death struggle. Yet after the war, didn’t the former mortal enemies join hands to rebuild the country peacefully? They did not pursue questions of right and wrong from the war. Once the war ended, why pursue them? Even today, we cannot clearly distinguish who was right or wrong in that great conflict—must we really?” This shows just how naïve and absurd Marshall was. Having someone so childishly ignorant of China preside over Nationalist–Communist negotiations was bound to end in disaster.

At Marshall’s request, a three-man committee was formed, consisting of Zhang Qun of the Nationalists, Zhou Enlai of the Communists, and Marshall himself. It served as a communication channel during military clashes and as a forum to discuss urgent disputes. On January 10, a ceasefire agreement was reached, taking effect at midnight on January 13.

Unfortunately, the mediation ultimately failed. Marshall was deceived by the CCP, and his mediation objectively helped the Communists by giving them a breathing space to redeploy forces during the ceasefire. The CCP used the pause in fighting to complete its troop deployments. Marshall’s mediation enabled Communist forces to recover from their defeat in the Battle of Siping and later launch a counteroffensive. General Douglas MacArthur commented on Marshall’s mission by saying, “Marshall’s mission to China was one of the greatest mistakes in the history of American diplomacy. From that point on, the free world would pay a price in blood and disaster”—perhaps an indefinitely prolonged price in blood.

Marshall made a crucial contribution to the CCP’s success. In late spring 1946, when Communist forces were collapsing across Manchuria, Marshall applied decisive pressure on Chiang Kai-shek, forcing him to halt the pursuit of Communist troops in the Northeast. Marshall threatened that if the pursuit continued, the United States would stop transporting Nationalist troops to Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to yield and agree to a fifteen-day ceasefire. This decision allowed the CCP to escape from a desperate situation. Mao Zedong had been compelled on June 3 to prepare to abandon Harbin. Upon receiving news of the ceasefire order, the CCP immediately changed its deployment: it held Harbin and retained control of the area north of the Songhua River.

Marshall saved the CCP. Chiang Kai-shek’s forced halt of the advance north of the Songhua River was a grave mistake. Had Nationalist forces continued relentless pursuit, they could have prevented the CCP from establishing a northern Manchurian base near the Soviet border, cutting off the railway supply lines from the Soviet Union and preventing the transport of heavy Soviet weapons. Without these, the CCP would not have been able to establish and expand its base areas in northern Manchuria.