Chapter 03: The United States Allows Soviet Expansion in China, 1920s (Part II)

From the moment Time magazine first featured a Chinese figure on its cover in 1924, it was clear that American public opinion was paying close attention to developments in China. Wu Peifu was regarded by American opinion as the leader most likely to unify China. Yet while Stalin acted with impunity—brazenly extending his grasp into China and using arms and money to exert complete control over the situation—the U.S. government remained silent. In international affairs, and especially with regard to China, America made no sound at all. Both the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and the Communist Party took their orders entirely from Stalin. Under the planning of Soviet advisers, they jointly launched the “Northern Expedition,” rapidly advancing to Beijing and overthrowing the Beiyang government of the Republic of China—the only government internationally recognized at the time.

Under Soviet advisers’ planning, the two parties jointly initiated the Northern Expedition, quickly reached Beijing, and toppled the internationally recognized Beijing government. In 1926, Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek abruptly dismissed the Soviet advisers and imposed restrictions on Communist participation in government. After the Northern Expedition concluded, on April 12, 1927, Chiang carried out the “purge of the Communists,” expelling the Chinese Communist Party from the Kuomintang–Communist alliance. That August, the Chinese Communist Party launched an armed uprising in Nanchang. China thus plunged into a civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists.

During the Nationalist–Communist war, the Soviet Union “played both sides,” assuming a dual role: on the one hand, it recognized the Republic of China government; on the other, it colluded with and provided strong support to the Chinese Communist Party. During the civil war, the Soviet-backed CCP Central Committee established a state within a state—the Chinese Soviet Republic—in Ruijin, Jiangxi. Its political platform was “armed defense of the Soviets,” openly declaring itself a Soviet appendage and an agent of communism. Although in 1934 the Kuomintang crushed the Chinese Soviet Republic and dealt the CCP a heavy blow, the CCP Central Committee then led hundreds of thousands of Red Army troops on a massive retreat. Two years later, they arrived in northern Shaanxi.

Lacking legitimacy and justification, the CCP established base areas in northern Shaanxi under the banner of a united front against Japan, forcing Chiang Kai-shek—despite a stark imbalance in economic and military strength—to declare war on Japan, thereby directing the flames of war toward the Kuomintang. The CCP, meanwhile, exploited Chiang’s resistance against Japan to drain Nationalist military power while gradually strengthening itself. The Xi’an Incident of 1936 marked another turning point in the CCP’s fate. Under Soviet guidance and with the assistance of Zhang Xueliang, the CCP was revived from near extinction. The Soviet Union turned the CCP into a breeding ground for the communist virus. The CCP did not disappoint Soviet expectations: the civil war continued until 1949, when the CCP seized power nationwide.

Mao Zedong once said that the Communists should thank Japan: without Japan’s invasion of China, there would have been no Nationalist–Communist cooperation; without it, the CCP could not have developed and ultimately seized power. Japanese imperialism, he said, was their “good teacher.” First, it weakened Chiang Kai-shek; second, it enabled the CCP to develop its base areas and armed forces. Before the War of Resistance, the CCP’s forces had once reached 300,000, but due to its own mistakes were reduced to just over 20,000. During the eight years of war, its forces grew to 1.2 million. Japan, Mao concluded, had rendered the CCP great assistance.

The founding, development, and expansion of the Chinese Communist Party were not only due to Japan’s invasion of the Republic of China, which gravely weakened the Kuomintang, but were also inseparable from America’s isolationist foreign policy. Had the U.S. government upheld justice—issuing strong protests against Soviet interference in China’s internal affairs and against Stalin’s shipment of arms to fuel China’s civil war—the Soviet Union would have been deterred by American power and would not have dared to act so recklessly. Unfortunately, after the 1920s the United States adopted an isolationist foreign policy, withdrawing completely to focus on domestic affairs while ignoring the global expansion of communism and its ravages in China. Expansionism is synonymous with communism. America’s disregard for communist expansion was an act of extreme shortsightedness. The result was to create ideal conditions for communist expansion.

After World War I, the U.S. Congress rejected President Wilson’s proposal for American participation in the League of Nations. As a result, the United States failed to join the League and to play a role in international affairs. The lack of a broad vision for international security within Congress led the United States to retreat from global engagement—an enormous mistake. Wilson’s most valuable political legacy was the concept of collective international security: world peace cannot be achieved through isolation. Congress failed to recognize that, as the world’s leading power, the United States had to shoulder responsibility and act decisively on the global stage.

American isolationism has seemed almost a tradition. From World War I to World War II, it persisted. From the 1920s through the 1930s, as global tensions accumulated and the risk of war became unmistakable, the United States still declared neutrality and maintained a posture of nonintervention, keeping itself outside world affairs. When the leader abdicates responsibility, rogue states grow stronger and encroach on their neighbors’ interests. When conflicts cannot be resolved, war becomes inevitable. Once war ignites, the United States is inevitably drawn in. Today, as communist forces experience a resurgence, America cannot afford to stand aside.

Zhong Wen concludes: Withdrawal from international groupings marked the beginning of America’s tragedy, and the tragedy of isolationist diplomacy may not be far from us. After the 45th president, Donald Trump, took office, he repeatedly withdrew from international frameworks—the first being the TPP. Beyond withdrawal, he haggled with America’s staunch allies and pursued a form of “neo-isolationist” diplomacy. He addressed leaders of communist states—enemies of humanity—as brothers, linking arms with them. It can be said that for most of his term, the U.S. executive branch under his leadership lacked a clear direction, treating friends as enemies and enemies as friends, thereby losing sight of its greatest adversary—the Chinese Communist Party. Only in the final year of his term, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, did he show some awakening. By then, however, the damage caused by withdrawal had already been done. The CCP had grown powerful and now sought to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the United States—too large to restrain, too entrenched to subdue. The harm inflicted by America’s isolationist foreign policy has been immense indeed.