Chapter 02: American Inaction—Allowing Soviet Massacres and the Great Famine of the 1920s (Part II)

Hoover once led relief efforts in Europe at the end of World War I. “The Bolshevik regime … appealed to Hoover to save Russia’s children, just as he had once saved the people of Belgium.” Some negotiations followed. Lenin did not want relief efforts to bring with them the “toxic influence” of American capitalism or the idea of free elections. But before long, the free grain remained, and millions of lives were saved.

By 1924, the Soviet regime believed it could do without American food aid. Lenin implemented the “New Economic Policy.” The Soviet economy became somewhat less autocratic and more oriented toward the free market. This policy also curbed the compulsory requisition of grain from peasants, allowing them to pay taxes in grain instead. Some have raised a troubling question: had Hoover not extended a helping hand, we might never know how long the famine would have lasted—or how long the communist government itself might have endured. At the time, a critic asked Hoover whether his actions had helped Bolshevism. Hoover retorted, “Twenty million people are starving. Whatever their politics, they must be fed!” At that time, Hoover acted as a humanitarian and had not yet clearly recognized the true nature of the Soviet system. He certainly did not realize that the domestic famine in the Soviet Union was in fact a deliberate, state-orchestrated massacre of the kulak class.

Even during the famine, Lenin never forgot to export revolution and continued to expand international communist support. This included providing substantial funding in 1921 that helped give birth to the Chinese Communist Party. During the famine, Lenin also intensified persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1922, he launched a campaign to confiscate church property, from which the Soviet Communist Party obtained assets worth 4.5 million rubles. The Soviet government’s actions in setting itself against God and against Christ would, in the author’s view, ultimately invite retribution and divine punishment.

The great famine was entirely the result of the Soviet Communist Party’s brutal policies. By eliminating the kulaks and confiscating land, the Party caused the collapse of the rural economy. The United States provided humanitarian aid, but it did not raise a voice of justice. It did not condemn the inhumane policies of the Soviet Communist Party, nor did it offer political support to persecuted religious figures, defend religious faith, or support peasants who rose up to fight for survival. The same pattern repeated itself during China’s great famine in 1962. Faced with the famine brought about by China’s Great Leap Forward, the United States expressed willingness to provide food aid—even proposing barter trade despite the absence of direct commerce between the two countries. Such disaster relief, akin to a mere “bandage,” carried a distinct “missionary” mentality and was utterly ineffective against a state that had turned against its own people. Without addressing the political system that caused the famine in the first place, relief grain would never reach the victims; instead, it might even be diverted to produce Maotai liquor.

During the 1922 famine, Lenin nonetheless convened an international communist conference in the Far East, exporting revolution to Asian countries such as China and India. At this meeting, the slogan “oppose American imperialism” was raised for the first time, openly identifying the United States as an enemy and pursuing global expansion through a communist offensive. Faced with this Soviet offensive, the United States offered no response, acquiescing and allowing communist forces to expand across Asia and the world.

Before serving as the 31st president of the United States from 1929 to 1933, Herbert Hoover had enjoyed a distinguished reputation as a mining engineer. As a “great humanitarian,” he provided food to war-ravaged Europe during and after World War I and was widely thanked by many nations. In 1931, after Japan launched the September 18 Incident and occupied China’s three northeastern provinces, Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson articulated what became known as the Hoover–Stimson Doctrine, commonly called the “non-recognition doctrine.” Based on the principle that “illegal acts do not create rights,” it held that the United States would not recognize territorial changes brought about by force, nor any territory seized through military aggression.

In response to Japan’s occupation of the Northeast, the government of the Republic of China appealed to the League of Nations, demanding sanctions against Japanese aggression, while also notifying Britain and the United States in hopes that they would uphold justice by advising or intervening against Japan. On September 25, 1931, the Japanese ambassador in Washington submitted a statement to the U.S. government, assuring that Japan did not intend a military occupation but merely sought to eliminate threats to the South Manchuria Railway from the flank, and that its troops would withdraw once this objective was achieved. The statement solemnly pledged that Japan harbored no territorial ambitions in Manchuria. As Secretary of State, Stimson clearly understood that the speed of the Japanese military action revealed a premeditated strategic plan, and that withdrawal was highly unlikely. Although he recognized Japan’s intent to occupy northeastern China, he nonetheless failed to impose corresponding sanctions on the Japanese government, effectively acquiescing in Japan’s occupation. President Hoover likewise turned a blind eye. Hoover’s indulgence of Japanese militarism allowed Japan’s ambitions to expand unchecked, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, which directly drew the United States into World War II.

A week before Hoover celebrated his 40th birthday in London, Germany declared war on France. The U.S. consul asked Hoover to help bring stranded American tourists home. Within six weeks, Hoover and the committee he led assisted 120,000 Americans in returning to the United States. He then turned to an even more arduous task—providing food to Belgium under German occupation.

Zhong Wen concludes: Hoover came from an entrepreneurial background and possessed extraordinary executive ability. Unfortunately, he was ill-fated in timing, encountering the once-in-a-century Great Depression during his presidency. Hoover attempted to rescue the economy by expanding employment through the construction of highways and large dams. Clearly, this was not a remedy that addressed the root cause. The Great Depression stemmed from an inherent “pathology” of the capitalist economy—extreme polarization between rich and poor. Without addressing the problem of how the “cake” is divided, simply trying to “make the cake bigger” through massive development could not resolve social contradictions. The severe social tensions exposed by the economic crisis were only gradually eased under his successor Franklin D. Roosevelt, through the New Deal and its “social welfare programs.” Hoover was forced to leave office in disappointment due to his failure to manage the national economy—such was fate and circumstance. Nevertheless, after leaving office, Hoover gradually came to a clear understanding of the true nature of communism. His post-presidency views on communism were lucid, and his anti-communist stance firm—an aspect that merits recognition.