This chapter builds upon the discussion of congressional “gridlock,” delving deeply into its internal structural decay: not only the “excessive checks and balances” in institutional design, but more critically, the degradation of Congress’s professionalism as a legislative body, which has become dominated by extreme partisan ideology, leading to a continuous decline in the quality and efficiency of legislation.

First Thesis: The Transformation from “Legislators” to “Political Performers”

I. The Loss of Expertise and the Priority of “Political Correctness”

For most of “Spring” and “Summer,” members of Congress were generally regarded as legislative professionals, possessing long-term service experience, deep backgrounds in law or public policy, and independent professional staff teams (such as the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment). However, under the polarized climate of “Winter,” this professionalism is undergoing systematic degradation.

Partisan Loyalty Supersedes Professional Competence: The political survival of legislators no longer depends on their ability to solve problems or their legislative achievements, but rather on their partisan loyalty and ideological purity. Any act of bipartisan compromise that demonstrates “professionalism” is viewed by their extreme base as “betrayal.”

The Rise of “Performative Politics”: Many legislators have shifted their focus from committee work within Congress to “political performance” in the media. Their primary responsibility has become posting extreme statements on social media and attacking opponents on cable news, in exchange for national attention and campaign contributions. Legislation itself has become secondary, mere “background noise.”

II. The Systematic Decline of Staff Professionalism

The decline in Congress’s legislative capacity is directly linked to the erosion of professionalism within its staff system:

The Hollowing Out of Knowledge Capital: Congress’s own research institutions, such as the Office of Technology Assessment, were closed in the 1990s. Legislators increasingly rely on partisan think tanks, lobbying groups, or outside consulting firms for information and bill drafting, information that often carries strong ideological bias or bears the stamp of special interests.

The “Revolving Door” for Young Staff: Due to the poor working environment caused by polarization and the lack of attractive salaries, professional young staff members serve briefly in Congress before quickly moving to lobbying firms, where they use the knowledge accumulated on Capitol Hill to serve private interests. This further strengthens the “revolving door” mechanism formed in “Autumn,” weaponizing professional expertise.

Second Thesis: The Bastion of Ideology and the Decline of Legislative Quality

III. The “Black Boxing” of the Legislative Process and the Lack of Transparency

The degradation of professionalism has transformed Congress’s legislative process from open, deliberative debate into opaque “black box operations”:

The Marginalization of Committees: In the past, substantive deliberation and amendment of bills took place primarily in specialized committees. Today, because party leadership distrusts committees, many important bills (particularly budgets and major spending bills) are drafted behind closed doors in leadership offices, then brought to the floor for a vote in a very short time.

The Normalization of “Omnibus Legislation”: Large, complex bills are often brought to the floor in “packaged” form at the last minute, leaving legislators no time to read, let alone deeply understand, thousands of pages of technical details and potential consequences. This greatly reduces legislative quality and facilitates the insertion of “riders” by private interests and special interest groups.

IV. The Priority of Extreme Ideology and the “Misalignment of Governance”

Congressional gridlock forces both parties to rely more heavily on extreme ideology to mobilize their bases, leading to a severe misalignment of legislative priorities.

The “Litmus Test” of Ideology: Much legislation is used as a “litmus test” to verify a legislator’s ideological purity, rather than as a solution to practical problems. For example, legislation on guns, abortion, or historical narratives aims more at sending a “political signal” than at achieving lasting, effective law.

The “Misalignment of Governance”: When Congress is dominated by extreme ideology, it lacks the capacity to respond to genuine national crises. During the pandemic, while Congress’s intention was to help the people, the process of passing legislation was filled with partisan bickering and interest-based negotiations, delaying critical aid and public health decisions.

Third Thesis: The Backlash of Institutions: The Cycle from Expertise to Attrition

V. The Reinforcing Role of the Electoral System: The Devil of Redistricting

The degradation of congressional expertise and the radicalization of ideology are not accidental; they are structural outcomes driven by the electoral system:

The Lock-In of Safe Seats: Gerrymandering creates numerous “safe seats,” meaning legislators need not worry about challenges from moderates and need only focus on the extreme voters in their party primaries. This incentivizes legislators to adopt more radical positions.

The Accelerator of Money Politics: The campaign finance system forces legislators to spend enormous amounts of time “fundraising” from large donors who share their ideological leanings. This further reinforces their extreme tendencies, pushing them further away from legislative expertise and the actual needs of ordinary voters.

VI. The Complete Collapse of Trust and the Self-Negation of Institutions

The degradation of congressional professionalism and the normalization of internal attrition have caused public trust in the legislative branch to fall to historic lows (typically the lowest among all branches of government).

Public Cynicism: The public sees members of Congress attacking one another in the media and witnesses legislation filled with self-interest, leading to fundamental doubts about the efficiency and morality of the entire democratic system.

The Self-Negation of Institutions: Congress was meant to be the engine of the democratic system and a deliberative representative body. But when it becomes a stage for “political performers” and a “bastion of ideology,” it effectively negates its own existence value as a “legislative body.”

VII. Chapter Conclusion: The Crisis of Legislative Quality

The degradation of congressional professionalism is a deep manifestation of the backlash against “excessive checks and balances.” It is not only a cause of political gridlock but also the root of the crisis in legislative quality. When legislators place ideological purity above the capacity to solve problems, the blueprint for national governance becomes crude, riddled with loopholes, and ultimately incapable of functioning.

This exhaustion of legislative quality renders government governance fragile, costly, and unstable, further intensifying public discontent with the entire system.

NEXT: Chapter 14: The Chronic Disease of the Senate: The Conflict Between Equality and Democracy — “Two Seats per State” and Minority Rule